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Essays on the Chinese and the U.S. Housing Markets
Abstract
Housing is one of the most important assets for households and has profound implications for the
economy. Housing markets in different nations may differ in institutional backgrounds and phases of
housing cycles, but people across the world are faced with some similar challenges in understanding
housing markets. This dissertation is international in scope and focuses on certain aspects of the
housing cycles. It consists of two chapters -- the first looks at boom-taming housing policies in China and
the second investigates the role of contagion in the previous U.S. housing cycle.
Chapter 1 examines the impact of major housing policy interventions in China. While research in the
Chinese housing market has been hampered by severe data limitations, I propose turning to the stock
market, where high quality and high frequency data on real estate firms are available. An event study
analysis is conducted on the April 2010 central government announcement, which suddenly and sharply
reversed prior policies and initiated efforts to cool the housing market by tightening mortgage credit
supply. I find that publicly traded housing developers listed on the Shanghai, Shenzhen or Hong Kong
stock exchanges suffered an average of -15% cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in a short event window
around the policy announcement. This loss in firm value indicates that the policy intervention is wellreceived by the market. Transaction volumes are likely to decline in the short run and the steady-state
house price appreciation rate is expected to drop as well. There also is noteworthy heterogeneity in the
CAR, with firms that engage in some non-residential development performing about three percentage
points better. Firms whose largest shareholder is a state-owned enterprise affiliated with the central
government perform about five percentage points worse. This latter result provides useful insights into
the relative magnitudes of the costs and benefits of having special connections to the central
government.
In Chapter 2, which is written jointly with Anthony DeFusco, Fernando Ferreira and Joe Gyourko, we
investigate whether contagion in the housing market, which is defined as the price correlation across
space between two different metropolitan areas above and beyond that justified by common local shocks,
was an important factor in the last American housing cycle. We implement empirical strategies that help
address concerns that plague prior contagion-related research. Besides that, the richness of our
proprietary housing transaction data allows us to directly estimate the importance of contagion
mechanisms. We find that contagion effects arise during the housing boom, and only from the very
closest neighbor -- the elasticity of focal market prices with respect to changes in its nearest neighbor's
prices is in the range of 0.10-0.27. This is large enough to account for up to 30% of the jump in home
prices at the beginning of local booms, on average. There is noteworthy heterogeneity in this result, with
contagion impacts being much greater when transmitted from a larger to a smaller market, and also more
important for the most elastically-supplied markets. Finally, local fundamentals and expectations of
future fundamentals have very limited ability to account for our estimated effect. This suggests a
potential role for non-rational forces in generating house price expectations.
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implications for the economy. Housing markets in different nations may differ in institutional backgrounds and phases of housing cycles, but people across the world are
faced with some similar challenges in understanding housing markets. This dissertation is international in scope and focuses on certain aspects of the housing cycles. It
consists of two chapters – the first looks at boom-taming housing policies in China
and the second investigates the role of contagion in the previous U.S. housing cycle.
Chapter 1 examines the impact of major housing policy interventions in China.
While research in the Chinese housing market has been hampered by severe data limitations, I propose turning to the stock market, where high quality and high frequency
data on real estate firms are available. An event study analysis is conducted on the
April 2010 central government announcement, which suddenly and sharply reversed
prior policies and initiated efforts to cool the housing market by tightening mortgage
credit supply. I find that publicly traded housing developers listed on the Shanghai,
Shenzhen or Hong Kong stock exchanges suffered an average of -15% cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in a short event window around the policy announcement. This
loss in firm value indicates that the policy intervention is well-received by the market.
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Transaction volumes are likely to decline in the short run and the steady-state house
price appreciation rate is expected to drop as well. There also is noteworthy heterogeneity in the CAR, with firms that engage in some non-residential development
performing about three percentage points better. Firms whose largest shareholder
is a state-owned enterprise affiliated with the central government perform about five
percentage points worse. This latter result provides useful insights into the relative
magnitudes of the costs and benefits of having special connections to the central
government.
In Chapter 2, which is written jointly with Anthony DeFusco, Fernando Ferreira
and Joe Gyourko, we investigate whether contagion in the housing market, which
is defined as the price correlation across space between two different metropolitan
areas above and beyond that justified by common local shocks, was an important
factor in the last American housing cycle. We implement empirical strategies that
help address concerns that plague prior contagion-related research. Besides that, the
richness of our proprietary housing transaction data allows us to directly estimate
the importance of contagion mechanisms. We find that contagion effects arise during
the housing boom, and only from the very closest neighbor – the elasticity of focal
market prices with respect to changes in its nearest neighbor’s prices is in the range
of 0.10-0.27. This is large enough to account for up to 30% of the jump in home prices
at the beginning of local booms, on average. There is noteworthy heterogeneity in
this result, with contagion impacts being much greater when transmitted from a
larger to a smaller market, and also more important for the most elastically-supplied
markets. Finally, local fundamentals and expectations of future fundamentals have
very limited ability to account for our estimated effect. This suggests a potential role
for non-rational forces in generating house price expectations.
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Chapter 1
Evaluating Housing Policy
Interventions in China Using Stock
Market Data

1

1.1

Introduction

Understanding China’s housing market and the impact of housing policy interventions has been an intriguing topic for scholars, policy makers, and investors. This is
naturally explained by the country’s importance in global economic growth and its
recent extraordinary housing boom.1 The Chinese government also intervenes in the
housing market on a regular basis. Following a period of encouraging home purchase
and real estate investment, the central government suddenly changed direction beginning in April 2010 to try to cool the housing market. New regulations were issued,
which tightened credit supply for housing speculators via increases in minimum down
payments and mortgage interest rates.2
Whether these regulations are effective in controlling housing demand and taming
house price growth has profound implications for China. Housing is a large sector
in the Chinese economy, with real estate investment accounting for 13% of China’s
GDP in 20113 and land sales being a crucial component of local public finance.4
This question also is relevant for the well-being of Chinese households, about 90% of
which own their homes.5 Moreover, a potential slowdown in the housing market, if
caused by these stringent regulations, is likely to cause global spillovers.6 Despite all
the above importance, economists know very little about the impact of the housing
1
For example, Wu, Gyourko and Deng (2012) document run-ups in land prices, house prices and
price-to-rent ratios during 2008 and 2009, which can hardly be justified by market fundamentals.
2
According to definitions by the Chinese government, housing speculators refer to: (1) buyers of
multiple homes; or (2) buyers who do not live or work (pay taxes) in the cities in which they intend
to buy homes.
3
Source: the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China.
4
The state is the ultimate owner of urban land in China. Local governments sell land use rights
via public auctions officially since 2002 (Cai, Henderson and Zhang (2009), Gordon and Li (2012),
Deng, Gyourko and Wu (2012)). According to the NBS, 30%-50% of local government revenues
come from land auction proceeds.
5
According to China Household Finance Survey (2012), the home ownership rate in China reached
89.7%. This high home ownership rate, widely documented in other studies, is partly a result of the
housing privatization reform in the 1990s which allowed employees to purchase homes that they had
been renting from their state employers at lower-than-market prices (Wang (2011)).
6
For example, Ahuja and Myrvoda (2012) suggest that a hypothesized decline in real estate
investment would disrupt the production chain throughout the Chinese economy and cause negative
spillovers to other G20 economies.
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policy changes or their overall effectiveness.
A key reason is that empirical research about the Chinese housing market has
been impeded by a lack of appropriate data. Publicly available house price series are
not considered reliable.7 The quality of micro-level transaction data also tends to be
flawed because of the opaque nature of the resale and rental markets in China. In
many cases, actual values of home transactions are not accurately observed. In addition, most cities do not have consistent housing data until 2006, leaving researchers
a fairly short time-series with which to study market dynamics. Beyond data limitations, the way in which the Chinese government intervenes in the housing market
also poses challenges in terms of research design. Major housing acts are decided
by the central government and enforced nationally at the same time, which makes
it difficult to find any exogenous variation across markets to help identify housing
policy impacts. Another complexity arises from the fact that housing policies change
frequently and sometimes switch directions. Therefore, if one must rely on data that
takes a considerable time to collect or is released with a long lag, it can be difficult
to tease out the effect of a single policy.8
In this paper, I propose a different strategy to evaluate recent changes in the
Chinese housing policy that helps get around these limitations. Specifically, I turn
to the equity markets where good quality and high frequency data is available on
publicly traded real estate firms. A standard event study is conducted to determine
whether and how policy interventions are capitalized into the market value of real
7

For example, the so-called 70-Cities Index, which is the most influential of the official house
price series provided by the Chinese government, shows little volatility over time and little or no
evidence of a boom in some big coastal markets widely believed to have boomed. Wu, Deng and Liu
(2011) and Deng, Gyourko and Wu (2012) provide critiques of this series, along with others publicly
available in China.
8
These empirical challenges do not equally affect all possible policy analysis, of course. There are
a few exceptions with appropriate data available and strong research designs feasible. For example,
Wang (2011, 2012) provide quantitative estimates of the impact of housing privatization reform in
the 1990s on both housing markets and labor markets using a panel dataset collected from household
surveys. Cai, Henderson and Zhang (2009) collect urban land auction data in Beijing from 2003 to
2007 and compare the outcomes of different types of auctions for land-use rights.
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estate firms. Because stock returns reflect expected future changes in firm cash flows,
the extent of capitalization of the policy change into real estate firm value also can
inform us about expected changes in housing market fundamentals.
The focus of my empirical work is the housing policy officially released on April
17, 2010 (commonly known as the State Council “Document Number 10”), which
tightened mortgage lending criteria for housing speculators and marked the first surprising reversal from previously expansionary housing policies that had been in place
since 2008.9 Because this policy intervention was exogenous to firm value and was
released without prior public anticipation, its announcement effect can be captured
within a properly-defined short event window. Empirically, I find that real estate
stocks responded quickly to the housing policy shift and in a manner that was consistent with the time line of the policy release. There was an average cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) for real estate firms of about -15% until day 5 (relative to
the date of policy announcement), which is an economically meaningful effect and
stands up under various robustness tests.
If one is willing to make simplifying assumptions about the real estate firms and
the underlying property markets in which these firms operate, this negative impact
on firm value can help us anticipate how the policy will affect the housing market
itself. I do so in an admittedly stylized way by considering the empirical implication
from a dynamic housing model (Glaeser, et al. (2012)), which posits that house
price in an area will grow at constant rate in steady state unless there is a shock to
local fundamentals. Translated into this scenario, the well-received Chinese policy,
which represents a shock to credit market conditions, would imply a decline in house
price appreciation rate. While this exercise is not meant to be taken literally, it
still is useful in helping us understand the range of housing price changes that are
9

Refer to the State Council “Guowuyuan guanyu jianjue ezhi bufen chengshi fangjia guokuai
shangzhang de tongzhi ” [Notice of the State Council to Resolutely Curb the Rapid Rise in Housing
Prices in Some Cities], Guofa[2010], No.10. See Section 1.2.1 for more details on this policy.

4

consistent with a -15% CAR for housing developers. The calculations reported below
indicate that the -15% housing-policy-induced abnormal return is consistent with an
up to 10 percentage point drop in house price appreciation rate. Therefore, this April
policy change well could prove effective in controlling housing demand and stabilizing
housing prices, both of which seem to be key goals of the central government.
Within the housing literature, this paper also contributes to our understanding
of how tightening down payment requirements affects housing demand and housing
prices.10 Credible estimates of this effect typically are difficult to produce because
of the inherent endogeneity of leverage decisions in most contexts. In this case, I
am able to examine an exogenous change in leverage requirements in China and
provide reduced-form estimates of their impact. That said, one should be careful
about generalizing these predictions to other countries because the mortgage market
and credit policy in China have some distinctive institutional features.
Beyond documenting the average policy impact, I explore the heterogeneity in
policy impacts across firms by whether they also engage in development of nonresidential properties, by geographic exposure of their residential properties and by
how politically connected the firms are. While these characteristics are presumed to
affect intensity of the policy impact, estimates of their roles may be plagued by the
endogeneity concern. To deal with this concern, I argue that identification is rested
on the following facts: (1) the announcement of the policy is exogenous to firm value;
(2) the policy intervention does not stipulate ex-ante rules that would favor some
firms over others; and (3) there is no evidence of more speculative buyers sorting into
a particular type of firms through the mechanisms being considered in this paper.
When controlling for other firm characteristics and potential omitted variables, I
10

This topic has an international scope. Much academic work has focused on the role of interest
rate and other credit market conditions in the U.S. housing cycle (for example, Himmelberg, Mayer
and Sinai (2005), Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko (2010), Mian and Sufi (2009, 2011), Favilukis,
Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburg (2010)). Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) show that both housing
demand and housing price respond to changes in credit constraints. Geanakoplos (2010) argues the
importance of managing leverage cycles in the housing market.
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find that firms with some concentration in non-residential real estate development
experienced an additional cumulative abnormal return of about 3%, which partially
counterbalances the negative policy shock. Firms developing residential properties
in speculative markets suffer an additional -4% abnormal return, but this effect is
not statistically significant because most of the firms have geographically diversified
portfolios. Finally, I detect an additional cumulative abnormal return of about 5% for firms whose largest shareholder is a state-owned enterprise affiliated with the
central government. In this context, the expectation that those firms would be more
vulnerable to a cutback in government support than private firms outweighs the usual
benefits of political connections in buffering negative market shocks.
In sum, this paper is the first to show that equity market data can be used successfully to evaluate the impact of housing policy changes by the Chinese government,
especially when appropriate data on the underlying market are not available or would
be very costly to collect. In addition, the event study approach employed is shown
to be valid in the Chinese policy context investigated. It also is insightful in that
abnormal stock returns provide meaningful implications for future outcomes in the
housing market, as well as the values of specific firm attributes that are important
to real estate firms. Beyond the April housing policy intervention, the approach proposed in this paper can further be applied to a myriad of questions related to China’s
housing market and to examining the consequences and effectiveness of other policy
interventions in sectors where primary data quality is suspect.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 introduces background.
A description of data can be found in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 documents the abnormal
announcement return of real estate firms in an event study and Section 1.5 talks
about its implications for the underlying housing market. I then investigate the
relationship between abnormal returns and firm attributes in Section 1.6. There is a
brief conclusion.
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1.2

Background

In this section, I introduce some basic facts about China’s housing market and recent
housing policies, and then provide some background on publicly traded real estate
firms.

1.2.1

The Housing Market and Recent Housing Policies in
China

China has been in a housing boom for more than a decade. It is widely documented
that the rising housing demand driven by urbanization and the tradition of favoring
home ownership contribute to the boom.11 The most dramatic acceleration in house
price, however, occurred at the end of 2008. Both price-to-rent and price-to-income
ratios took off at that time. While there could be multiple causes of this recent housing
boom, one consensus is that the government-sponsored stimulus package issued in
November 2008, which provided cheap loans to both real estate developers and home
buyers, contributed to rising house prices thereafter (Wu, Gyourko and Deng (2012),
Deng, Morck, Wu, Yeung (2011)). Such a credit expansion encouraged not only home
purchases for consumption use, but also home investment by speculators.12
While no official measure exists in tracking housing speculation over time or across
markets, several home vacancy studies help us gauge how speculative the housing
markets are. In an electronic mapping project, the Beijing Police estimated that 29%
of the homes in Beijing were unoccupied in June 2012.13 While this number was
11

Urbanization is driving housing demand in China. A 1% increase in urban population growth
among local hukou holders (i.e., residents) would lead to at least 0.54 percentage point house price
appreciation between 2002 and 2008 (Wang and Zhang (2012)). In addition, the social norm in
China favors home ownership and encourages households with a son to buy homes to improve their
relative competitiveness in the marriage market (Wei and Zhang (2011)).
12
Extensive research in the U.S. has suggested the important role of speculators in blowing up
the prices during the boom and worsening the subsequent downturn by defaulting quickly and in
large numbers (See Bayer et al. (2011), Campbell et al.(2011), Haughwout et al.(2012), Chinco and
Mayer (2012)).
13
See the news articles in Global Times and Peoples Daily (“Policy Gap Allows Hoarders to
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disputed for including new units waiting to be sold, other onsite surveys also confirm
that at least 20% of the already-sold units were apparently left unoccupied in selected
residential complexes in Beijing and Shenzhen during the boom.14 Speculators were
active not only in superstar cities, but in second-tier and third-tier cities as well.15
According to the 2011 China Household Finance Survey which covers twenty-five
provinces in China, about 20% of the urban households own at least two homes.
In order to curb excessive growth in housing price and to tame housing speculation,
the State Council of China unveiled three major waves of housing policies in 2010
and 2011. The leading policy, known as the State Council “Document Number 10”,
was released on April 17, 2010.16 This act is widely interpreted as the first reversal
from the expansionary policies enacted during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.17 The
most substantial change in this policy involved tightening mortgage supply for housing
speculators (Article #3 of “Document Number 10”). For example, the minimum down
payment ratio for second-home purchases, which we consider as speculative purchases,
was raised to 50% from 40%. It also called for mortgage rates for speculative purchases
to be no less than 110% of the base rate. Non-residents can no longer obtain mortgages
to buy homes in a city unless they have paid taxes in that city for at least one year.
Figure 1.1 plots the minimum down payment rules for different types of buyers over
time. First-home buyers are those who purchase homes for their own occupancy.18
Undermine Property Curbs”, June 12, 2012).
14
For example, the China Central Television aired two documentaries of on-site home vacancy
surveys in Beijing (April 2010) and Shenzhen (April 2012). Their main approach was to count the
number of lights at night and the number of people entering/exiting the neighborhoods during week
days.
15
One extreme example would be Sanya, a Miami-like tourist destination in Hainan Province.
Nearly 85% of the residential properties were unoccupied according to the official data revealed by
the local housing bureau in early 2012.
16
The official document was disclosed on April 17, 2010, but its major contents were revealed to the
public on April 15, 2010, by the Premier of China. Per below, I take April 15 as the announcement
date of the housing policy.
17
“The Turning Point in Housing” in China Leadership Monitor (vol.33, 2010) provides a good
interpretation of the State Council “Document Number 10”.
18
Both households buying their first homes and those buying new homes to upgrade their existing
homes belong to the category of “first-home buyers”.
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According to Figure 1.1, the April policy further distinguishes speculators from firsthome buyers, and represents the first shift from previous regulations.
Besides the central focus of regulating mortgage supply to speculators, “Document Number 10” specified the responsibilities of local governments to curb house
price growth, to guarantee effective supply of housing (Article #1, 2, 5, 6) and to
construct government-sponsored housing units (Article #7). It also strengthened supervision over housing developers and punishes violators more severely (Article #8,
9). Appendix Table 1.A has a detailed description of this policy.
The State Council made two subsequent policy announcements on September 29,
2010, and January 26, 2011, both of which stepped up their initial efforts to tighten
mortgage lending policies.19 The September policy required all first-home buyers
to pay 30% of their transaction values upfront, and it stopped providing mortgages
to third-home buyers. The January policy further raised the minimum down payment to 60% for second-home buyers and imposed home purchasing limits on urban
households.20
In this paper, I focus on the April housing policy because it was the first policy
reversal from expansionary policies during the financial crisis and was a real surprise. The two follow-up policies added only marginal changes to the April policy
and were likely to have been anticipated to some extent. Section 1.4.4.4 has more
discussions on this. Before moving on to the data, the following subsection provides
some background on publicly traded real estate firms in China.
19

Refer to the State Council “Guojia youguan buwei chutai cuoshi ezhi bufen chengshi fangjia
guokuai shangzhang” [Measures on Curbing the Rapid Rise in Housing Prices in Some Chinese Cities]
(September 29, 2010) and “Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jinyibu zuohao fangdichan shichang
tiaokong gongzuo youguan wenti de tongzhi ” [Notice of the State Council to Further Tighten the
Regulation of China’s Real Estate Market] (January 26, 2011).
20
In general, households satisfying the following criteria are not allowed to buy any more homes
in a city: (1) city residents who already own two homes; (2) non-residents who already own one
home; and (3) non-residents who have not paid taxes in that city for a certain number of years.
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1.2.2

Publicly-Traded Real Estate Firms in China

The largest real estate firms in China are publicly traded. They are largely listed
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) as well as two mainland stock exchanges
– the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE).
Table 1.1 shows how representative publicly traded real estate firms are along various
dimensions. Information about publicly-traded real estate firms is calculated based
on the sample adopted in this paper (see Section 1.3 for details) and data on all real
estate firms are available on an annual basis from the National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS). According to Table 1.1, publicly traded real estate firms constitute no more
than 1% of all firms in the industry, but they represent 7%-8% of the total assets
and approximately 14% of the market share nationwide in terms of sales revenue.
Beyond those numbers, publicly-traded real estate firms also remain the most active
and reputable firms in the real estate industry.21
It is worth noting that Table 1.1 is likely to under-estimate the importance of
publicly traded real estate firms because the NBS adopts a broader definition of
real estate firms and may include project-based firms, which are temporarily set up
for some housing projects and become inactive after the projects are finished. In
addition, figures in Table 1.1 represent national averages and may undervalue the
market share of publicly traded real estate firms in more established cities where
those firms operate.
Overall, publicly traded real estate firms represent major and active players in the
housing market. Their behavior and performance give us a good picture of the real
estate industry and the housing market in China.22
21

For example, 9 of the top 10 real estate firms in China are publicly traded according to SouFun
Real Estate Enterprise Research in 2011.
22
Unless otherwise mentioned, “housing market” in this paper exclusively refers to the private
housing market, in which more than 60% of the homes transacted involve newly-constructed units
sold by real estate firms. The performance of public (i.e., government-sponsored) housing market is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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1.3

Data

I start with all publicly traded firms on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx), the
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) because
the affected real estate firms (i.e., the treatment sample) are typically listed on one
of the three stock exchanges. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are two
mainland stock exchanges supervised by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and are available mostly to domestic investors. The Hong Kong Stock
Exchange attracts both local and foreign investors and is effectively an overseas stock
exchange subject to independent regulation.23
The treatment sample of interest is all publicly traded real estate firms that develop residential properties in mainland China, which are directly affected by the
housing policy interventions.24 I develop the treatment sample from the official list
of real estate firms provided by each stock exchange. I pick the category “J01” (Real
Estate Development and Operation) firms listed on the SSE and SZSE according to
the CSRC industry classification system. For firms listed on the HKEx, I choose the
“Real Estate” category according to the Hang Seng Industry Classification.25
Going through company profiles and financial reports over time, I collect information about each firm’s business lines, IPO date and any business switch since its IPO.
I then apply the following restrictions to address various concerns in the event study.
23

In this paper, I only consider the A-share equity markets of the SSE and SZSE. “A” shares are
priced and traded in Renminbi and are largely available to mainland investors in China. Foreign
investors are approved to trade “A” shares under some quotas. The B-share markets of the SSE and
SZSE are open to foreign investors trading in U.S. dollars and Hong Kong dollars, respectively, and
they are much smaller than the A-share markets in terms of total market value and turnover value.
There are six real estate firms in the sample cross-listed on both A-share and B-share markets, but
less than 10% of their total shares are issued on the B-share market. Throughout this paper, the
results for the B-share stocks are not reported along. However, the performance of B-share real
estate stocks is very similar to that of their A-share counterparts.
24
In this paper, I also examined a placebo sample of firms outside the real estate industry. See
Section 1.4.4.3 for details on sample construction.
25
The industry classification code is updated and overwritten frequently. I collected the code in
April 2012, and double checked with firm information further back in time to make sure that the
2012 industry code reflects the firm status in 2009 and 2010.
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First, I require that firms maintain their principal business in mainland China, so
that they are directly subject to the housing policy interventions and barely subject
to other region-specific shocks. Thus, real estate firms operating locally in Hong Kong
and publicly traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are not included in the treatment sample. Second, I require that the real estate firms do not participate in other
industries outside real estate. Otherwise, the stock response to the housing policy
shift would be confounded by other contemporaneous industry-specific shocks. Third,
each firm in the sample should have data since January 1, 2009, so that I have a long
enough time-series to estimate individual stock returns. More specifically, firms that
had an IPO or transformed themselves into real estate firms after January 1, 2009
are not included in this paper.
Table 1.2 has a brief summary of the sample. About 4%-6% of all publicly traded
firms on the three stock exchanges are identified as real estate firms. They are above
the median in terms of market value, which is consistent with the fact that publicly
traded real estate firms in China are large. The final treatment sample consists of
129 firms: 46 publicly traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 45 on the Shanghai
Stock Exchange and 38 on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Daily stock prices and
returns (without dividends) for each firm are obtained from the China Securities
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and Bloomberg.

1.4

The Housing Policy and Real Estate Stock Returns

I begin the empirical analysis with examining whether the policy intervention to cool
the housing market results in negative stock returns for real estate firms.
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1.4.1

Methodology

In order to account for market-wide movements, I use the classical event study approach to analyze abnormal returns of real estate stocks in response to the housing
policy. Several institutional features of the April policy make it well-suited to an
event study analysis.
First, this policy is exogenous to real estate firms. It is a decision of the State
Council Standing Committee, not triggered by any particular firm or industry. In
many countries, one would naturally worry about lobbying, especially by firms with
strong political connections. They might talk to policy makers and try to influence
them to make decisions that favor those particular firms. Although there is no reason
to rule out this possibility, it is less likely to happen in this context. First, the
housing policy amounts to a negative shock and is a bad news to firms. Firms do
not have strong incentives to persuade decision makers to carry out a policy that
works against their own interest. In addition, the housing policy does not specify
anything that would differentially “protect” some real estate firms than others. The
only quantifiable article of this policy is to tame speculative demand. As such, there
is no evidence of firms manipulating specific rules and cutoffs to avoid being punished.
Second, like other top-level policies in China, the housing policy intervention
was not leaked to the public beforehand via channels unobservable to economists.
Individuals would be jailed for leaking confidential policies or economic data ahead
of their official release and enabling insiders to profit. Thus, the policy effect can
be captured within a short window around the policy announcement. This differs
greatly from many cases in the U.S. or in other democratic countries, where public
debate may cause the stock market to respond long before any bills get approved.
Besides these institutional conventions, the Real Estate Climate Index of China
offers another piece of evidence to bolster the argument that the public did not know
the housing policy before its announcement. This monthly climate index reflects
13

overall conditions and prospects for housing sector.26 According to Figure 1.3, the
index had been trending up since early 2009 and did not show any signs of decline
until April 2010. Therefore, the housing market was expected to be improving until
the surprising onset of the April policy shift.
It is also worth noting that the “no prior information leakage” assumption does not
exclude the possibility that there may be official notification shortly before the actual
policy announcement. Fortunately, the exact dates of all previous announcements can
be clearly identified in China. Thus, we can recover the full policy impacts accurately
by flexibly defining event windows to embrace prior notices. In this particular case,
the head of China’s Banking Regulatory Commission made a public speech at the
Boao Asia Forum four calendar days before the official policy announcement and this
event well could have caused stock market reaction in advance. Sections 1.4.3 and
1.4.4 below examine this directly. If anything happens even prior, my estimate would
reflect a lower bound of the real impact of the April policy.
Third, the fact that the April policy represents a sudden policy reversal and that it
was not correlated or coordinated with other macro events validates the interpretation
of it being the source of any abnormal returns detected. This, however, may not be
applied to some of the other Chinese housing policies, which were either riddled with
ambiguity or were released together with other economy-wide policies. In those cases,
it would be difficult to tease out the particular effects coming from housing policy
interventions.27
26

The index is available from the National Bureau of Statistics. It is calculated at the national level
by drawing information from monthly statistics of real estate investment, sales and development. A
reading above 100 is considered to reflect good conditions.
27
Section 1.4.4.3 addresses the concern of confounding events. This paper also evaluates other
recent housing policy interventions during 2008 and 2011, in which the announcement effects are
either not significant or small in magnitude. See Section 1.4.4.4 for details.
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1.4.2

Empirical Framework

Following conventions in the literature, I use the multivariate regression framework
in which abnormal return is parameterized in an individual stock return equation.28
To deal with the concern that the overall market may be affected by the April policy,
I estimate risk-adjusted returns:

Ri,t = αi + βi Rm,t + γi,k Dt,k + εi,t

(1.1)

where t is the relative trading day to the announcement date of the housing policy;
Ri,t is the daily stock return of firm i between closing prices at day t and day (t − 1);
and Rm,t is the daily return of the market portfolio.29 The dummy variable Dt,k takes
on a value of 1 if day t falls in the event window starting since day -20 until day k
(k ∈ [−20, 20], k ∈ Z):

Dt,k =




1 if − 20 ≤ t ≤ k


0 if otherwise.

Figure 1.2 illustrates the time line of the event study analysis. Day 0 is taken
as April 15, 2010, which is the first time the policy was released to the public by
the Premier of China (April 17 is the date when the official policy document was
disclosed). The whole estimation period starts from January 1, 2009 and ends 20
days after the official announcement. Analogous to the traditional residual analysis
approach (Campbell et al.(1997), MacKinlay (1997)), γi,k is interpreted as the average
daily abnormal return over the [−20, k] event window for firm i. Accordingly, the firm28

See Binder (1985), Dube et al (2011), etc. I also follow the procedure outlined in Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), which calculates abnormal return as the deviation of actual return from
predicted return during the event window. This traditional residual analysis produces similar results
to those from the regression method, but the former does not account for correlated errors in the
cross section, which could be a serious concern in this setting because all firms are in the same
industry and the event time completely overlaps.
29
I use the composite index of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and the Hang Seng
Index of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange when calculating market returns of each stock exchange.
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specific cumulative abnormal return is calculated as: CARi [−20, k] = (k + 21) · γi,k .
There is no definitive rule regarding the choice of event window in the literature. In
this paper, I start the event window 20 trading days before the policy announcement
in order to detect any potential pre-trends caused by prior notifications. Ignoring
pre-trends would bias the estimates of the housing policy impact toward zero. The
same window length was used in other studies of corporate events such as earnings
announcements (MacKinlay (1997)). To the extent that the results may be sensitive to
the choice of window length, I experiment with alternative windows, such as [−10, k]
and [−5, k]. See Section 1.4.4.1 for more details on this.
The return equations are jointly estimated for all firms using generalized least
squares. This accounts for the fact that the abnormal returns are likely to be contemporaneously correlated when firms are in the same industry and experience the
same event.

1.4.3

Baseline Estimates

To examine the overall stock response to the housing policy, I test the null hypothesis
that the average abnormal return among real estate firms is equal to zero during
each event window [−20, k]. I sequentially extend k from day -20 to day 20 to investigate the dynamics of abnormal returns during the entire course of the policy
announcement.

N

H0 :

1.4.3.1

X
1
CAR[−20, k] = (k + 21)
γi,k = 0,
N
i=1

(k ∈ [−20, 20], k ∈ Z)

Full Sample Result

Table 1.3 Column (1) shows the baseline results for the full sample of 129 real estate
stocks. Average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and its asymptotic standard
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errors are reported. The null hypothesis being rejected at conventional significance
levels are indicated with stars. Results for only selected event windows are reported
for space reasons. Correspondingly, the complete schedule of average CAR and its
95% confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 1.4.
Not surprisingly, real estate stock returns react negatively and timely to the April
housing policy shift. From day -20 to day -5, average cumulative abnormal return is
not distinguishable from zero, but it turns negative and significant starting at day -4.
It then rapidly accumulates between day -3 and day 5 and reaches -15.5% over the
[-20,5] event window. In the next 15 days following day 5, the negative response does
not seem to go away quickly, with average CAR bouncing around -15%. However,
this paper does not focus on this persisting trend. As is mentioned in the literature,
the interpretation of abnormal stock returns over the longer run is more likely to
be contaminated by noise (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997)). Throughout this
paper, I interpret the -15% abnormal return (until day 5) as the response triggered
by the April policy intervention.
Another important finding is that the negative stock response is detected approximately three days in advance, and this pre-trend can be justified by a particular
event as briefly mentioned in Section 1.4.1. Figure 1.2 sketches the time line of all
housing-related events around the announcement of “Document Number 10.”30 On
April 11 (the non-trading Saturday before day -3), the former chairman of China’s
Banking Regulatory Commission, Liu Mingkang, made a speech at the Boao Forum
for Asia (BFA).31 He warned banks of mortgage lending risks and urged banks to
tighten lending policies for housing speculators by raising down payment require30

I collect the dates on which those events were reported from the Xinhua News Agency, which is
the largest official press bureau in China. Since the Xinhua Agency is also responsible for censoring
important news to be released in China, no other media outlets are likely to take the lead. Thus, the
dates I collect should accurately document when each of the events was announced to the public.
31
This non-governmental Forum is one of the most influential forums for leaders in government,
business and academia in Asia and other continents to share visions on the most pressing issues.
The BFA is held annually in Boao, China. It is an important event for which major newspapers
would reserve special columns.
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ments and mortgage interest rates. Although the speech was non-governmental (i.e.,
unofficial) in nature, it was largely in line with the mortgage policies stipulated later
in “Document Number 10,” and was made known to the public through major newspapers. Therefore, it can account for the pre-trend of a negative CAR, which becomes
significant at the 1% level since day -3. In addition, the special sessions on China’s
housing market since the start of the BFA on April 8 are likely to explain the modestly
negative CAR around day -5.
It is also striking that the negative cumulative abnormal return does not accumulate evenly over time. The most dramatic plunges of the CAR happen exactly at the
time when there are important information disclosures. To be specific, the majority
of the -15% CAR over the [-20,5] window is realized immediately after the two critical
events on April 11 and April 17, while the rest gets accumulated in between. For example, the next-day (day -3) abnormal return is about -3.5% in response to Chairman
Liu’s speech on April 11. After the official document of the policy was released to the
public on April 17, the next two trading days (day 2 and day 3) experience an abnormal return of -6.5%. Noticeably, real estate stocks respond to housing-policy-related
events in a timely manner.

1.4.3.2

Stock Responses across Stock Exchanges

To the extent that the Hong Kong and the two mainland stock markets have different
institutional features and attract different types of investors, the housing policy may
have a differential impact on HK-listed and mainland-listed firms. Columns (2) and
(3) of Table 1.3 report the average cumulative abnormal return for real estate firms
publicly traded on the HKEx and the two mainland stock exchanges, respectively.
Figure 1.5 provides graphical evidence.
While negative reactions are universally documented, mainland-listed firms tend
to respond earlier than HK-listed firms. The negative response of mainland-listed
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firms becomes significant on day -5 (April 8) possibly due to the housing-related
discussions at the Boao Forum. HK-listed firms, however, react only modestly on day
-3 to Mr. Liu’s public speech. The negative CAR does not become significant until
around day 0.
The difference in the timing of stock responses across stock exchanges could be
explained by how the policy information becomes known to investors. First of all, the
policy news may be broadcasted more intensively in mainland, but may come with
a lag or with some loss in translation to Hong Kong investors. Moreover, mainland
investors, who invest mostly via the two mainland stock exchanges, may be more
sensitive to mainland policy changes.
Similar to the full sample findings, two discrete plunges in the CAR are detected
among both HK-listed and mainland-listed firms, which account for the majority of
negative responses over the event window. The one-day abnormal return in response
to Mr. Liu’s speech is -2.3% for HK-listed firms and -4.2% for mainland-listed firms.
After the official release of the policy document on April 17, the immediate abnormal
return over day 2 and day 3 is approximately -5% and -7% for HK-listed and mainlandlisted real estate firms, respectively.

1.4.4

Robustness Tests and Extensions

So far, I have estimated an average cumulative abnormal return of around -15% in
response to the announcement of “Document Number 10”. In this section, a few
robustness tests are performed to lend support to the magnitude and interpretation
of this estimated impact.

1.4.4.1

Alternative Event Windows

One of the concerns in any event study analysis is the choice of event window. Short
windows around event dates are widely adopted in the literature, but there is no
19

definitive way of picking the “correct” length of window. Should the baseline findings
be sensitive to this, I repeat the analysis with alternative event windows starting
on day -10 and day -5. Table 1.4 compares CAR[−10, k] and CAR[−5, k] with the
baseline results for the full sample of firms.
The average CAR exhibits similar patterns from columns (1) to (3). Negative
and significant response is detected approximately 4 days before day 0 and accumulates after that. More encouragingly, CAR[−10, k] stays pretty much the same as
CAR[−20, k], which is consistent with the fact that there is basically no abnormal
return before day -10. However, starting the event window from day -5 produces
smaller estimates in magnitude, because the negative (though not significant) response around day -5 is not fully captured.
Thus, the baseline findings as discussed in Section 1.4.3 hold regardless of the
specification of event windows. Extending the event window further back in time
has the strength of detecting pre-trends and capturing stock responses to the housing
policy more accurately. Per below, I always use the event window staring from day
-20 in the baseline analysis and use other windows as robustness checks.

1.4.4.2

Time-Shifted Placebo Events

To affirm that the policy effect is not a coincidence driven by local patterns in the
data, I re-estimate Equation (1.1) on a set of placebo events. I construct the placebo
events by randomly shifting the actual event date (April 15, 2010) backward as well
as forward in time by 20, 30, 40, 50, 100 and 150 days. I then estimate the 5-day
average cumulative abnormal return (CAR[−2, 2]) around each placebo event.
I report the results in Table 1.5. None of the placebo events shifted backward in
time cause significant abnormal returns. Only the two placebo events shifted 40 days
and 50 days after the real event have negative CARs, which are significant at the 5%
level. But neither of them has a magnitude above 1.5%.
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The placebo event estimates support the argument that the baseline policy effect
is not obtained by chance. The pattern of no abnormal response before the policy and
sizable abnormal return immediately after the policy is consistent with the hypothesis
of the housing policy causing a decrease in the value of real estate firms. In addition,
the mild and negative abnormal return in the longer run after the policy, though not
definitively predicted by theory, is also reasonable and could be a result of a feedback
effect.

1.4.4.3

Non-Real-Estate Placebos

While the benchmark findings consider negative abnormal returns experienced by real
estate firms as the impact of the housing policy, this interpretation may be confounded
by other potential events that occurred around the same time. For example, there
could be unusual upswings in other sectors around the housing policy announcement
which left the real estate industry behind. It is also likely that some contemporaneous events (aside from housing policies) disproportionally depressed the real estate
industry relative to others. If either is the case, the estimated abnormal returns would
exaggerate the real housing policy impact.
To gauge the extent to which this is true, I run placebo tests on non-real-estate
firms. Intentionally, the candidate placebos do not include sectors that are closely
linked to or dependent on the real estate industry (for example, construction, banking,
steel and lumber). In theory, they are likely to be direct victims of the housing policy
shift.32 With this filter applied, I randomly select eight industries from both the
two mainland stock exchanges and the HKEx.33 These industries include agriculture,
manufacturing, mining, social services, etc.
32
Analysis on those industries finds that the construction and banking industries respond in similar
manners as the real estate industry. However, abnormal responses are not detected in the steel and
lumber industry immediately after the policy announcement.
33
The placebo analysis is done separately for the two mainland stock exchanges and the Hong
Kong stock exchange because they have different industry classification rules.
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One might argue that the placebo industries would also be affected by the housing
policy shift via common shocks to the economy. For example, since the housing
policy forecasts a deceleration of house price growth and the housing sector is a key
contributor to China’s GDP, investors may worry about the overall economic outlook
of China and devalue Chinese firms in other industries as well. This scenario, however,
should be picked up by the market beta of each firm. Above and beyond co-movements
with the market, there is little evidence of any pair-wise dependence between a placebo
industry and the real estate industry. Therefore, by default, we should not expect
any housing-policy-induced abnormal reactions among placebo firms.
Following the same procedure, I estimate abnormal returns for the placebo groups.
Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 report average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[−20, k])
at a 5-day interval for each placebo industry publicly traded on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange and the two mainland stock exchanges, respectively. Figure 1.6 and
Figure 1.7 provide graphical evidence paralleling the tables. Not surprisingly, hardly
any significant abnormal return is detected among the placebo groups during the
[−20, k] windows, in particular between day -5 and day 5 when the housing policy was
released. The agriculture and mining industries of the two mainland stock exchanges
may experience non-zero abnormal returns, but only randomly without noticeable
trends.34 And the magnitudes of their abnormal returns never exceed 5%.
These placebo estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that the stock returns
of firms that do not have direct business connections with the real estate industry
should not respond abnormally to the housing policy shift. This finding also provides
support for the claim that abnormal returns of real estate firms reflect just the effect
of the housing policy intervention, rather than that of other confounding events.
34

Abnormal returns among those industries may be caused by the release of CPI at the end of
April 2010. For example, the rise in pork prices led to positive abnormal return of agriculture firms
after day 15.
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1.4.4.4

Other Policy Events

In addition to “Document Number 10”, I evaluate three other recent housing policy
interventions using the event study method. Average cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR[−10, k]) are plotted in Appendix Figure 1.A.
The first is an expansionary policy, which was announced on December 20, 2008,
to boost the housing market.35 It aimed at encouraging home purchase and real
estate investment. Not surprisingly, positive abnormal return is detected around
this announcement. However, it is significantly distinguishable from zero during the
entire window. As mentioned in Section 1.4.1, this policy was introduced along with
many other monetary and fiscal policies during the same time. Thus, it is difficult to
separate out the housing policy impact.
Appendix Figure 1.A(ii) represents the April policy, while (iii) and (iv) refer to the
two policies announced on September 29, 2010, and January 26, 2011, as introduced
in Section 1.2. Not surprisingly, the April policy reversal brought about the largest
stock response among the three negative policy interventions after 2008. Investors
barely responded to the September 2010 policy, probably because it was basically a
supplement to the April policy and was not a big surprise. The January 2011 policy
was associated with significant abnormal return of around -5%. Besides being another
supplement to “Document Number 10”, it introduced for the first time purchasing
limits on households as a measure to tame speculators.

1.5

Implications for the Housing Market

So far, I have documented a -15% abnormal change in the market value of real estate
firms in response to the announcement of “Document Number 10.” The next question
35

Refer to the State Council “Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu cujing fangdichan shichang jiankang
fazhan de ruogan yijian” [Several Comments on Promoting the Healthy Growth of the Real Estate
Market], Document No.131, December 20, 2008.
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to explore is what this -15% abnormal return tells us about expected future outcomes
in the housing market where those firms operate.

1.5.1

Implied Policy Impact on the Housing Market

One noteworthy implication of the -15% abnormal return is that the policy intervention was well capitalized. To the extent that stock prices reflect rational expectations
of future changes in fundamentals, this negative stock response well could imply
gloomy prospects in the underlying housing market as perceived by investors. The
negative sentiments circulated among the stock market would then affect housing
investors’ expectations about future house price growth and lead to further declines
in housing price.36
Here, I start by discussing some potential outcomes in the housing market. First
and foremost, the April policy intervention implies a shock to housing demand. As
is discussed in Section 1.2, it tightened credit supply for speculative home buyers
and would directly suppress the demand of speculators whose budget constraints
become binding after the policy.37 Affluent speculators and first-home consumption
buyers may also adjust their views about the housing market and change their home
purchasing decisions. All together, the April policy would imply a negative shock to
housing demand.
In the short run, house price is widely documented to be sticky downward with
sales falling first in response to a negative demand shock (Case and Shiller (1989),
Case (2008)). No similar pattern has been documented in China in the literature
36

The recent literature has emphasized the importance of behavioral factors in the U.S. housing
boom, for example, Case and Shiller (2003), Case, Shiller and Thompson (2012).
37
In practice, marginal housing speculators did respond to the tightened mortgage policies by
increasing their down payment. For example, the average down payment ratio of second-home
buyers increased from 56% to 64% two months after the January 2011 housing policy, which raised
minimum down payment to 60% from 50% for second-home purchases (According to the Shanghai
Banking Regulatory Commission, that tracks the mortgage lending activities of four anonymous
banks in Shanghai from January to March, 2011). Unfortunately, relevant statistics before and after
the April 2010 policy shift are not reported.
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because the time series is not long enough to observe a complete housing cycle. However, the downward stickness of housing prices is equally likely to be true in China. In
addition to commonly-cited explanations such as search cost and loss aversion (e.g.,
Genesove and Mayer, 2001), the fact that housing developers in China face a menu
cost of lowering prices once the sales start also contributes to the inertia in housing
price. Therefore, the demand shock implied by the April intervention would be likely
to bring down transaction volumes in the short run, while home prices remain sticky
but possibly grow at a lower rate. In the longer run, housing developers may lower
their sales price to clear the inventory.
In order to interpret the policy shock to housing supply, it is important to notice
that the aggregate supply of housing is determined by the Chinese local governments,
with the latter deciding the amount of urban residential land supply and the floor area
to be built on each land parcel under the guidelines of the central government and
central land bureaus. Therefore, the local governments are the ultimate “monopoly”
suppliers of the housing market. Since the April policy urged local governments to
“guarantee effective supply” of urban land for residential use, it is most likely that
the shock to supply would be neutral or positive.38 However, a positive supply shock,
i.e. an outward shift of the supply curve, would put further downward pressure on
home prices.
To briefly sum up, the announcement of “Document Number 10” generated phenomenal market response. Transaction volumes are expected to decline in the short
run. In the long run, the momentum of house price growth is likely to slow down.
38

See Article #5 and #6 of “Document Number 10” (Appendix Table 1.A). In fact, land supply
is subject to local geographic, economic and regulatory concerns. It is also related to local political
economy, i.e., local governments may have different incentives from the central government since
30%-50% of the local revenues come from land auction proceeds. In this paper, I abstract from
all these concerns and assume that local governments would follow what was stipulated in the
“Document Number 10”.
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1.5.2

A Stylized Theoretical Framework

Beyond the potential consequences discussed above, one would still be interested in
knowing the magnitude of housing price change that is consistent with the -15%
abnormal return among real estate firms. The typical way to address this question
is to write down a dynamic housing equilibrium model, simulate the time series of
housing market outcomes with and without the policy intervention, and then assume
the future path of market outcomes is capitalized into real estate stock returns. We
could then back out the magnitude of expected housing market changes using the
estimated abnormal return. In this case, however, a dearth of housing and urban
data makes this approach impossible to carry out.
To shed some light on this question, I appeal to the dynamic spatial equilibrium
model developed in Glaeser, et al. (2012). One of the intuitions from their model
claims that house prices grow at a constant rate (α) in steady state. In this setting, a
demand shock implied by the policy intervention would shift the equilibrium so that
house prices grow at a lower rate (α0 ) in the new steady state.39

A Simple Calculation Now let’s consider the market value of real estate firms.
Suppose the housing market is populated by a continuum of identical real estate firms
of measure one. The Chinese government is the “monopoly” supplier in the market,
and firms are participants who split the monopoly profit by producing and selling
similar housing units in equilibrium. If each real estate firm operates over T years,
its market value can be written as the discounted value of all its future profits from
housing development:40
39
Here, we discuss a rational expectation model where the existence of housing bubble is not
incorporated.
40
This approach is adapted from the finance literature on future commodity prices and corporate
value, which presents discounted-cash-flow-based or option-based models to value mining and oil
companies (Tufano (1998), Blose and Shieh (1995), Jin and Jorion (2006), etc.). The underlying
idea is that changes in commodity price levels lead investors to change their perceptions of future
cash flows and adjust the perceived value of firms.

26

V =

T
X
πPt Qt
(1 + r)t
t=1

(1.2)

where Pt = equilibrium housing price in year t; Qt = equilibrium amount of housing
supply in year t; π = profit margin per unit;41 and r = discount rate.
Suppose in the original steady state, Pt = (1 + α)Pt−1 . After the policy intervention, house price follows Pt = (1 + α0 )Pt−1 . Based on discussions in Section 1.5.1,
I assume that the steady state aggregate housing supply does not change for simplicity.42 If we write down an expression for the market value change of real estate
firms (∆V /V ), we can then back out numerically the change in expected house price
growth (∆ = α0 − α) by imposing ∆V /V = −15%. Under various assumptions of
underlying parameters, this -15% abnormal return is consistent with a 3-9 percentage
point drop in expected house price appreciation. Figure 1.8 has more details.

1.5.3

Discussions

Next, I provide some evidence of changes in transaction volumes and house prices after
the April policy intervention. It helps us gauge effectiveness of the policy intervention,
but this exercise should not be interpreted as matching moments in data with the
stylized model predictions presented above.
Table 1.8 lists the summary statistics of floor area of housing sold in 35 major
Chinese cities from 2000 to 2011.43 As we can see, the housing policy shift was followed immediately by a drop in housing transaction volumes in 2010 and 2011 across
41

Here, I assume that the variable cost of home production, such as land and construction cost, can
be expressed as a proportion of house price. This expression does not include firm fixed cost, such
as the overhead expenses to obtain loans, licenses, permits, and etc. Technically, the April policy
intervention tightened regulations on developers and may raise the fixed cost of firm operation
(Article #8 and #9 of “Document Number 10”, see Appendix Table 1.A). In the calculation below,
I abstract away from this story and assume that the value decline of real estate firms only comes
from changes in house prices and quantities.
42
An increase in supply, which is likely to be the case after “Document Number 10”, would amplify
the slowdown in house price growth.
43
This information is available from the National Bureau of Statistics.
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the nation. It brought about the second decline in average housing transactions in
a decade (the first was triggered by the 2008 financial crisis). Average floor area
sold declined by 6% in 2010 compared to a year earlier and it continued to decline,
though less abruptly in 2011. Sixteen markets experienced sales declines in 2010, and
thirteen of them had double-digit decline.44 Figure 1.9 plots the floor area sold for
five of the ten speculative markets for which quantity data is available (see below in
Section 1.6.1.2 for the definition of speculative markets). On average, the speculative
markets experienced more dramatic sales declines in 2010: Beijing (-36.1%), Shanghai (-42.3%), Shenzhen (-42.3%) and City 1 (-40.5%), though the other anonymous
speculative market (City 2) experienced mild sales increase of 8.9%.
The changes in house price growth can be gauged by referring to Deng, Gyourko
and Wu (2012), in which they estimate the Hedonic home price index for 35 Chinese
cities. In their Figure 6 (Comparison of Real Newly-Built Housing Price Indexes), we
can observe a kink in home price series (i.e., a sudden change in price appreciation
rate) right after 2010Q1. This again, is consistent with the prediction that price
appreciate rate would decline after the policy intervention in April 2010.
The fact that transaction volumes dropped in the short run and house price growth
momentum slowed down is consistent with the predictions discussed in Section 1.5.1
and 1.5.2. Thus, “Document Number 10” seemed to be effective in taming housing demand and stabilizing house prices, both of which being the goals the central
government plan to achieve.
44

In 2011, eighteen markets experienced sales declines and twelve had double-digit declines. Only
ten markets experienced expansion in housing sales in both 2010 and 2011 and none of them
are coastal markets. These ten markets are Changchun, Chongqing, Haerbin, Huhehaote, Jinan,
Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, Wuhan, Xian and Xining.
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1.6

Heterogeneous Policy Impact and Firm Attributes

So far, I have shown that “Document Number 10” was readily interpreted as a negative shock to housing demand and brought about substantial responses in the stock
market. The stock responses, reflecting future fundamental changes in a timely manner, also carry important implications for the housing market.
Across firms, however, the intensity of market value decline depends on firm’s
exposure to the housing policy, and thus reveals the value of firm characteristics as
perceived by stock investors. In this section, I use this exogenous housing policy shift
to explore the heterogeneity in policy impact across firms along three dimensions:
firm concentration in non-residential properties, geographic exposure of residential
properties and firm political connections.

1.6.1

Sources of Heterogeneity: Theory and Measurement

1.6.1.1

Non-Residential Real Estate Concentration

The first relevant aspect of real estate firms I consider is what types of properties
firms develop or manage. In this case, building or owning non-housing assets would
buffer the negative shock because the part of firm value coming from non-housing
business lines would be less affected by the policy intervention. To formalize this
idea, suppose a portion α of firm’s market value comes from its non-housing assets
∗
∗
Vnon-housing
= αV ∗ , and the rest comes from housing development Vhousing
= (1−α)V ∗ .

Market value change for such a diversified real estate firm can be modified as:
∗
∆Vhousing
∆V ∗
(1 − α)∆V ∗
= ∗
=
∗
V∗
Vhousing + Vnon-housing
V∗

Accordingly, a positive share (α) of non-housing business would buffer the decline
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in firm value after the announcement of a housing-specific policy. One of the implicit
assumptions here is that the non-housing business line is independent from housing
development. It is a convenient assumption, but not necessary. However, as long
as the non-housing business would not be hit by the housing policy as severely or
directly as the housing business, the prediction would hold.
I collect information about property concentration from firm annual reports. I
then double check with information disclosed on official websites of the firms. Unfortunately, the share of non-housing business is not available in percentage terms
because most of the firms do not report detailed breakdown of their portfolio, such
as the percentage of revenue coming from non-housing business. Instead, I construct
a dummy variable indicating whether firms explicitly mention non-residential real estate (usually commercial real estate) as their “major line of business” in addition to
housing.45
According to Panel B of Table 1.9, 97 (or 75%) of the 129 real estate firms are
housing-oriented developers. This is consistent with the fact that the majority of
Chinese real estate firms do not have much expertise in managing non-residential
properties. The remaining 32 firms have non-residential real estate as their major
business in addition to housing development.

1.6.1.2

Geographic Exposure of Residential Properties

The Importance of Geographic Exposure
To the extent that the housing policy may have differential impacts across markets,
geographic exposure of the housing properties also matters. Here, I consider two
mechanisms through which geography affects policy impact.
One mechanism involves the nature of local housing markets before the policy. In
an extreme case where the market is composed merely of first-home buyers, house
45
To do that, I perform a textual search of firm annual reports. This information is usually
reported in the company profile or in the section introducing major business lines.
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price would not respond to changes in second-home mortgage policies. In more general cases, markets with more speculators are expected to experience larger drops in
equilibrium prices and quantities all else equal.46 Thus, developers in those markets
would suffer more severe declines in firm value.
Another mechanism has to do with local government efficiency and incentives.
First, the housing policy may be executed in some cities with a lag because of lower
government efficiencies. Second, to the extent that local governments rely on land
sales as a major source of revenue, more cash-constrained local governments may have
weaker incentives to follow the orders of the central government. In both cases, the
same housing policy may be implemented less effectively in those markets.
Measures of Geographical Exposure
Unfortunately, there are no publicly-available measures for the share of speculators
or the effectiveness of housing policy enforcement across markets. Instead, I use
confidential data on the number of distant home buyers for 80 Chinese cities from
January 2009 to March 2010.47 For each city, I calculate the percentage share of
buyers from outside the province/municipality. The ten cities with the highest share
of distant buyers are referred to as “speculative markets”. I then search the firm
annual reports over time and construct a dummy variable called “speculative markets”
to indicate whether each firm develops housing properties in at least one of the ten
speculative markets.
The ten markets cover three municipalities and three coastal provinces. Besides
attracting more distant buyers who are likely to be speculators, the three municipalities and at least one coastal province are known for their efficient local governments,
and serve as the role models for other Chinese cities. Therefore, distinguishing the
“speculative markets” from others would reasonably capture the two mechanisms of
46
47

This is based on the assumptions and discussions laid out in Section 1.5.1.
Names of the cities and provinces are screened in this paper for confidential concerns.
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geography exposure discussed above. According to Table 1.9, about 78% of the firms
have residential exposure in speculative markets.

1.6.1.3

Political Connections

Why Political Connections Matter for the Housing Policy Impact?
In this context of the April housing policy, the direction in which political connections drive the change of firm value is ambiguous because there are two mechanisms
operating in opposite directions.
On the one hand, it is widely recognized in China that political connections bring
both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to firms. Having political connections
implies easier access to bank loans, licenses, other resources key to business operation
(Bai et al., 2000, 2006; Li et al., 2008; Allen et al., 2011) as well as favorable treatment
in legal disputes (Li et al., 2008; Lu et al., 2011). Although little empirical evidence
is available, political connections may be equally valuable to real estate firms because
real estate is a capital-intensive business and government bureaus are involved in
each stage of housing development. Extensive networking and rent-seeking are often
necessary in acquiring financing, land, zoning approvals, and all kinds of construction
permits. Therefore, having political connections may well save financing costs and
operational costs of real estate firms. These durable benefits would help mitigate
the impact of negative housing policy shocks and help firms in distress as well. For
example, when market conditions become worse and firms are not able to sell enough
units to cover their financing and construction costs, connected firms have easier
access to loans provided by state banks, while private firms have to rely on their own
resources.
On the other hand, politically-connected firms are more sensitive to government
attitudes toward the real estate market. In other words, political connections could
amplify the impact of the housing policy on more connected firms. This can be
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explained by the following facts. First, the majority of the government-sponsored
support in the 2008-2009 stimulus plans was granted to politically connected firms.48
The new housing policy, however, diverges from those previous policies and signals
a withdrawal of government support from the housing market. As such, one might
expect politically connected firms to experience a more severe loss from this negative
policy turn. Second, politically connected firms, supervised by the governments, bear
the mission of carrying out government policies.49 Entrepreneurs from those firms also
have strong incentives to obey the rules because they may become politicians later in
their careers. In addition, politically connected firms may also undertake more social
responsibilities and engage themselves in less lucrative business such as constructing
government-sponsored housing.50 In sum, this housing policy shift initiated by the
central government may disproportionally hurt politically connected firms, especially
those connected to the central government.
Measures of the Degree of Political Connections
The political economy literature provides a multitude of measures for political
connections. In democratic countries, the CEOs’ or board members’ personal connections with a top politician are most commonly used to measure political connectedness
(Faccio 2006; Goldman et al., 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2010). Less durable connections
based on campaign contributions or cash transfers are also proposed (Claessens et al.,
2008). However, these measures are not available in China because personal linkages
between government officials and entrepreneurs/firms are either unobserved or not
reputably documented.
In this paper, I make use of the state ownership status of the largest shareholder
48

For example, Deng, Morck, Wu and Yeung (2011) find that nearly 60% of all new loans issued
to listed companies in the two mainland stock exchanges were received by state-owned enterprises
affiliated with the central government during the stimulus period.
49
Also see the “multi-task theory” of state-owned enterprises in China (Bai et al., 2000, 2006).
50
As briefly mentioned in Article #7 of “Document Number 10”, politically connected firms are
called upon to participate in the construction of government-sponsored housing units, which is less
profitable than regular business of developing commodity housing units.
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of each firm. It is a direct and objective indicator for firms’ political connectedness
in China. Specifically, I define a real estate firm as a state-controlled firm if it or its
largest shareholder is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) or a government entity.51 Firms
that do not belong to this category are defined as private firms, which by default have
lower degrees of political connections than their state-controlled counterparts.52
Further, I distinguish two kinds of state-controlled firms based on the types of
affiliation of their largest shareholders. “Central state-controlled” refers to statecontrolled firms whose largest shareholders are affiliated with the central government,
and “local state-controlled” refers to those whose largest shareholders are affiliated
with local governments. It is worth noting that these two types of firms have different
types of political connections.
In general, central state-controlled firms are believed to have broader and possibly
stronger connections than local state-controlled ones. However, in a localized business
such as real estate development, local state-controlled firms may reap extra benefit
from their acquaintance with local bureaus and administrations. The central vs.
local distinction is even more important here because the policy intervention was
announced by the central government. Naturally, central state-controlled firms would
be affected more directly and severely according to the second channel of political
connections discussed above. Local governments, on the other hand, are required to
but are less incentivized to carry out the new policy. In this sense, connections with
local governments tend to be more “beneficial” to firms than connections with the
central government.
Besides distinguishing the three types of firms, I also experiment with a contin51

This information is obtained from firm annual reports where the top ten shareholders are reported.
52
It is worth noting that this paper identifies more state-controlled firms than the official list of
state-owned enterprises (SOE) provided by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC) of the State Council. A broader definition of state-controlled firms is more
appropriate in this case because it takes into account both subsidiary firms of the “official” SOEs
and firms of which SOEs remain the largest shareholders and have control over.

34

uous measure of political connections. For each firm, I calculate the percentage of
“state-controlled shares” held by its largest shareholder. By construction, it equals
to the share of its largest shareholder if the firm is state-controlled, and zero if it is
a private firm. This variable, however, has a drawback. Although state shares may
suggest the intensity of political connections within each firm (Calomiris, Fisman
and Wang, 2010), this is not necessarily true across firms. Namely, the degree of
political connections may not be monotonically increasing in state-controlled shares
across firms. The categorical measure of political connections based on firm type is
cleaner and more appropriate and is thus taken as the baseline measure in this paper.
Later, I report the results using the continuous measure of state-controlled shares as
a robustness check.
According to Table 1.9, 55 (or 43%) out of the 129 real estate companies in the
final sample are state-controlled, of which 14 are affiliated with the central government. Panel A of Table 1.9 summarizes the financial characteristics of firms by degree
of political connections. Not surprisingly, central state-controlled real estate firms
are significantly larger by market capitalization than private firms and local statecontrolled firms. They also have stronger balance sheets than local state-controlled
firms in terms of leverage, though not statistically distinguishable from private firms
at conventional significance levels.

1.6.2

Regression Framework

Now, I take the above intuitions and examine the relationship between abnormal
returns and real estate firm traits in a regression framework. I estimate the following
equation:

CARi = α+βNonResidentiali +δSpeculativeMarketi +ηConnection0i +Zi0 ρ+ξi (1.3)
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where CARi is the estimated cumulative abnormal return for firm i over a certain
event window; N onResidentiali is an indicator of whether firm i has a concentration in non-residential real estate management or development; SpeculativeM arketi
indicates whether firm i develops residential properties in at least one of the ten speculative markets; and Connection0i is a vector of dummies indicating firms with various
degrees of political connections (central state-controlled firms, local state-controlled
firms and private firms). In addition, a set of firm-level covariates are included in Zi0 .
Equation (1.3) is adapted from the empirical specifications in the political economy literature that use instantaneous stock market responses to recover the value of
firm political connections.53 Abnormal stock returns around an exogenous event are
regressed on the variables indicating degrees of political connections, while controlling
for other basic firm characteristics. The literature varies in the choice of controls. One
common practice is to not control for any other firm traits besides the direct variables
of interest (for example, Fisman, 2001; Fisman et al., 2006). Others consider basic
controls such as firm size, leverage and book-to-market ratio (see Goldman et al.,
2009; Acemoglu et al., 2010). In this paper, I control for firm size (represented by
the natural logarithm of market capitalization), leverage (measured by the ratio of
net debt to common equity of shareholders) and firm profitability (proxied by return
on equity) at the end of 2009.
Regarding the dependent variable, there is no standard in the literature for the
length of event window over which to calculate CARs. Here, I follow the convention by considering an event window that ends shortly after the policy event. I then
report results over longer event windows for comparison.54 Given the complexity
53

For example, Fisman (2001), Fisman et al. (2006), Faccio (2006), Faccio et al. (2006), Acemoglu
(2010), etc. This line of research collects surprising news about politicians, compares news-induced
abnormal stock returns across firms with various degrees of connections to those politicians and
thereby recovers the value of firm political connections.
54
For example, Fisman (2001) and Fisman et al. (2006) use market-adjusted stock returns over
one day or five days after the event. Faccio (2006) uses CAR[−2, 2] and Goldman et al. (2008) use
CAR[1, 3]. Acemoglu et al. (2010) uses CAR[0, 1] in the baseline result and then CAR[0, 10] as a
robustness check.
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that the housing policy event consists of pre-event notifications as well as post-event
announcement, I use CARi [−20, 5] for firm i as the dependent variable in the benchmark specification. As discussed in Section 1.4.3, the [−20, 5] window is believed to
capture the full impact of the housing policy shift. It also reasonably represents the
“immediate” response without introducing longer-run noise. I then experiment with
CARs over various horizons in 1.6.4.2 and 1.6.4.3 as robustness checks.

1.6.3

Identification

Before moving on to the result, I talk about identification for the three firm attributes
of interest in the above framework. As argued in Section 1.4.1, the policy intervention
is exogenous to the value of real estate firms. What remains an empirical challenge
is the possibility of omitted factors biasing the result.
While the existing literature provides little theory or empirical strategies to deal
with the omitted variable bias, I address this concern first by adopting an extensive list
of control variables in Zi0 , which embrace firm size, leverage and profitability. These
characteristics may well affect the abnormal return of real estate firms in response to
the negative housing policy shock. For example, more profitable firms may have better
management teams and business strategies to get through adverse market conditions.
Firms overloaded with debt would be more vulnerable to market downturns. As those
basic firm characteristics are likely to be correlated with the variables of interest
(especially firm political connections as we can tell from Table 1.9), ignoring them
could bias the estimates of interest.
Second, I argue that some hypothesized concerns are not likely to pose threats
here because of some unique features of the Chinese housing market. By and large,
one would be worried that some omitted factors may potentially lead to differential
housing policy impact, but not through the channels of the firm characteristics of
interest. For example, if more speculators buy homes from state-controlled developers,
37

then the estimate for political connections would reflect the fundamental demand
shock which hit those firms more severely, rather than the true value of political
connections. Although this concern is legitimate, it is not likely to be the case in China
because state-controlled firms do not intentionally attract or look for more speculative
clientele. Only banks are able to know whether mortgage applicants are speculators
or not.55 Moreover, real estate firms in China, regardless of political connections or
other attributes, develop more or less similar housing units in terms of location and
physical attributes. In this regard, it is fair to assume that the speculator-taming
demand shock hit firms in similar manners, and thus the differential policy impacts
across firms should come from the firm attributes of interest.
Finally, I explicitly consider one particular kind of omitted variable. Since the
housing policy implies a turning point in the housing market, one natural possibility
is that real estate firms which benefited the most during the previous stimuli would
be subject to the strongest doubts over their growth potential. It is not clear why
some real estate firms enjoyed higher growth than others during the incredible boom,
but unobserved factors may have played an important role.56 These unobserved
characteristics may drive firms’ abnormal loss in a potential downturn as well beyond
observed attributes. To address this possibility, I include the growth rate of firms
from 2008 to 2009 in terms of market value and book value as additional controls in
the model.
55

Technically, only banks are able to distinguish speculators from first-home buyers when they
conduct background checks on mortgage applicants. Banks also are responsible for imposing the
differential leverage requirements on each type of buyers.
56
This argument is supported by the fact that the unprecedented growth in the housing market
during 2008 and 2009 can hardly be justified by fundamentals (Wu, Gyourko and Deng, 2012).
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1.6.4

Result

1.6.4.1

Benchmark Result

Table 1.10 reports the baseline results of estimating equation (1.3) using cumulative
abnormal returns from day -20 to day 5 (CAR[−20, 5]) as the dependent variable.
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported. Stock exchange dummies are included
in all specifications to capture common factors pertaining to the stock exchanges.
Columns (1) and (2) represent the unconditional effects coming from the firm traits
of interest – non-residential real estate concentration, geographic exposure of housing
properties and degree of political connections, which alone explain more than 17%
of the variation in abnormal stock returns. The preferred benchmark specification
in column (3) controls for all other firm covariates, such as firm size, leverage and
profitability. This weakens but does not wipe out the significance of the estimates of
interest.
As expected, the coefficient on non-residential real estate is positive and significant. Namely, a concentration in non-residential properties brings a higher abnormal
return of 3%, buffering the negative shock from the housing policy. Residential exposure in speculative markets causes more negative abnormal returns but the effect
is barely significant in a statistical sense. However, this should not be interpreted
as geography not mattering. In fact, the economic importance of geographic exposure is likely to be obscured by the fact that quite a few real estate firms have been
diversifying their housing properties across markets. For example, more than 50%
of the firms in the sample operate in more than three provinces/municipalities, and
most of them have been expanding their business to provincial cities and second-tier
or third-tier cities rather than confining themselves to first-tier cities.
The coefficient on the central state-controlled firms is -0.054 and statistically significant, suggesting that firms controlled by the central government or other central
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state-owned enterprises suffer an additional abnormal return of -5.4% compared to
private real estate firms over the [−20, 5] event window. The response of local statecontrolled firms is not distinguishable from that of private firms. It is also worth
noting that the relative ranking of coefficients on political connections is robust to
the inclusion of other firm-level characteristics. On average, central state-controlled
firms suffer the most severe losses and private firms the least.
The negative coefficients on state-controlled firms suggest that the second channel
of political connections (as discussed in Section 1.6.1.3) plays a dominant role in this
case. Namely, the expectation that state-controlled firms would suffer disproportionally from a reduction in government support and that they would follow government
policies more actively, outweighs the widely-acknowledged benefits of political connections in buffering negative market shocks. In addition, the second channel is assumed
to affect firms affiliated with the central government more directly because the housing policy is decided by the central government. This is born out in the empirical
results where state-controlled firms affiliated to the central government experience
more negative abnormal returns than those affiliated with local governments.
Column (4) uses the percentage of state-controlled shares held by the largest
shareholder as a proxy for firm political connections. I also include its interaction
term with being a central state-controlled firm to gauge the difference between connections with the central government versus local governments. In spite of its flaw in
reflecting true variations in political connections across firms (as discussed in Section
6.1.3), this continuous state-share variable predicts more negative abnormal returns
for state-controlled firms, especially for those connected with the central government.57 However, this effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Coefficients on other firm-level covariates are suppressed in the table. Only firm
57

To interpret the coefficient, a one percentage point increase in the state shares held by the largest
shareholder would lead to an additional -10 basis points abnormal return for a central state-controlled
firm.
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size has a significant impact. A 1% increase in market capitalization leads to an
additional abnormal return of around -1.5 basis points. In case of outliers driving the
result, column (5) repeats the same regression as column (3) but on a restricted sample
where firms in the top and bottom 2% distribution of CAR[−20, 5] are trimmed. This
produces similar estimates as the full sample.
Following discussions in Section 1.6.3, I then capture omitted factors by controlling
for firms’ growth rate in terms of market capitalization and total asset (at book value)
from 2008 to 2009. Estimates are reported in column (2) and (3) of Table 1.11,
which shift the baseline estimates in column (1) only slightly. Firm concentration in
non-residential business and political connections continue to matter beyond omitted
factors. In addition, the coefficient on the 2008-to-2009 growth rate of total assets is
significantly negative, suggesting that all else equal, an additional 1% increase in the
book value of total asset during the boom is associated with an additional cumulative
abnormal return of -4.2 basis points.

1.6.4.2

Robustness Tests: Alternative Event Windows

In order to confirm that the above results reflect the true relationship between abnormal policy response and firm traits of interest rather than some spurious local
correlations in data, I estimate equation (1.3) using cumulative abnormal returns
over alternative event windows as the dependent variables in Table 1.12.
Column (1) is the benchmark result (taken from column (3) in Table 1.10) for
comparison. Columns (2) to (3) use more immediate abnormal returns after the
release of the official policy document, CAR[−20, 3] and CAR[−20, 4], respectively
as dependent variables. Both of them produce similar results to the benchmark.
Firms with non-residential real estate concentrations suffer less compared to housingoriented developers. Similarly, central state-controlled firms exhibit significantly more
negative abnormal returns than private firms, and the discrepancy is bigger when we
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look at more instantaneous responses. Column (4) examines longer-run abnormal
return until day 10 and the relationship is more or less similar to that in the short
run. The benefit of engaging in non-residential real estate seems to accumulate 10
days after the policy announcement. The last column uses alternative starts of event
windows and examines CAR[−10, 5]. Again, the estimates stay similar to those in
the benchmark specification.

1.6.4.3

Result over the Course of Policy Release

The next question of interest involves how the relationship between abnormal returns and firm traits changes over the course of the policy announcement. To investigate this, I estimate the baseline specification sequentially using CAR[−20, k]
(k ∈ [−20, 20], k ∈ Z) as the dependent variables. Figure 1.10 and 1.11 plots the
point estimates and the 95% confidence intervals over k for the four coefficients of
interest. The figures are truncated at k = 10 because this paper focuses on short-run
stock responses. Relationships and abnormal returns over the longer run are subject
to noise.
Figure 1.10 plot coefficients on non-residential real estate concentration and speculative markets, respectively. Again, property diversification is an important determinant of abnormal response to the housing policy shift. Compared with housingoriented developers, firms with non-housing concentration enjoy an additional CAR
of 2% to 3%, mitigating the negative policy shock. Residential exposure in superstar
markets, however, does not matter significantly in statistical sense. As is discussed
above, those firms have already diversified their portfolios geographically. Figure 1.11
plot the two coefficients on state-controlled firms. Central state-controlled firms suffer an additional CAR of -5% to -7% compared to private firms during the course of
the policy issuance. The coefficient on local state-controlled firms, however, is not
significantly distinguishable from zero.
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One noteworthy finding is that firm traits begin to matter only after we observe
abnormal returns. This is consistent with the intuition that the relationship between
abnormal returns and firm traits should appear only when the abnormal returns show
up. During normal periods, there is little justification for such a relationship. The
effect of political connections synchronizes the time line of the policy announcement,
which does not become significant until people learned of the BFA speech on mortgage
regulations (after day -4). The value of non-residential real estate concentration,
however, is not revealed until the full release of the official policy document (after day
1). This timing difference can be explained by how the policy content was gradually
released. Before day 2, only the core piece of “Document Number 10” – tightening
mortgage requirements for speculators – was unveiled to the public. Only after reading
the entire policy document did investors learn that the policy was only targeted at
the housing market, thus allowing them to form differential beliefs about firms with
non-residential real estate concentrations.

1.7

Conclusion

In this paper, I use high frequency financial market data and the event study approach
to provide the first estimates of the impact of the Chinese housing policy reversal in
April 2010, which tightened mortgage credit supply for housing speculators. The policy brought about timely and economically meaningful responses in the stock market.
It produced cumulative abnormal returns for affected real estate firms of about -15%,
which is consistent with an up to 10 percentage point drop in equilibrium house price
appreciation rate.
Across firms, I find that some concentration in non-residential real estate provides a hedge against housing-specific policy risks, mitigating the negative abnormal
return by about 3 percentage points. Meanwhile, firms whose largest shareholder is
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a state-owned enterprise affiliated with the central government suffer 5 percentage
points more abnormal returns compared to observationally equivalent private firms.
In this case, the conventional benefits of political connections are counteracted by the
expectation that connected firms would be hurt more severely from a withdrawal of
government support and that they would follow central policies more actively than
other firms.
This paper is the first to use equity market data to evaluate the impact of specific
housing policy changes by the Chinese government. The event study methodology is
shown to be appropriate in this Chinese policy context, and is useful especially when
appropriate data on the underlying housing market are not readily available. Policy
makers would thus be able to gauge immediately the effectiveness of policies and
predict expected changes in the housing market and in other related industries, such as
the steel and construction industry. The approach also is insightful in that abnormal
stock returns provide meaningful implications for the values of firm attributes that
are particularly relevant to real estate firms. More generally, the success of this
research design in evaluating the April 2010 policy reversal suggests that the equity
markets could prove very useful in analyzing the consequences of other housing-related
events and the effectiveness of policy interventions in other sectors where primary data
quality is flawed.
This paper also contributes to the understanding of housing developers in China.
For example, it is worthwhile for firms to diversify their property portfolio because
engaging in non-residential development may provide a hedge against housing policy risks. The differential policy impact on state-controlled firms and private firms
suggests some role of political connections in the housing market. However, to fully
understand and distinguish the underlying mechanisms would require more sophisticated models and explicit measures of the benefits and costs that are tied with
political connections.
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Within the housing literature, this paper provides novel empirical evidence of the
impact of tightening down payment requirements on housing demand and housing
prices. While research in this field has been challenged by the endogeneity of leverage
decisions, I investigate an exogenous change in leverage requirements in China and
provide reduced-form estimates. I document an up to 10 percentage point drop in
equilibrium house price growth rate associated with a 10 percentage point increase in
required minimum down payments for housing speculators. This estimate tends to be
useful for us to interpret consequences of leverage policies in other countries as well.
However, one should be careful generalizing predictions in this paper to a broader
context because of some unique characteristics of the Chinese mortgage market and
mortgage policies.
Finally, one of the limitations of this paper and this method is that the results
represent only the perceived value of real estate firms around the policy announcement, but do not perfectly predict the performance of the housing market or real
estate firms in the long run. Future work remains to be done to fully understand
the resulting impact of mortgage policies on housing demand, house prices and so
on. More interesting topics, such as how home investors, especially those near the
down payment thresholds respond to the changes in leverage regulations and how the
impact of the mortgage policy varies across markets, will require different research
designs as well as high-quality housing transaction data.
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Table 1.1: Publicly Traded Real Estate Firms as a Percentage of All Real Estate
Firms

Year
2008
2009
2010

Share of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies
Number of Firms Total Asset Sales Revenue
0.15%
7.1%
13.4%
0.16%
7.9%
14.0%
0.15%
8.4%
15.0%

Note: Information about publicly traded real estate firms is calculated
based on the sample adopted in this paper (See Section 1.3 for the selection of this sample). Data on all real estate firms are available from the
National Bureau of Statistics.
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Table 1.2: Sample of Publicly Traded Real Estate Firms
(Market capitalization in billion USD)
All Publicly Traded Firms
Publicly Traded Real Estate Firms
# of Firms Median Market Cap
# of Firms Median Market Cap
Stock Market
(Std. dev.)
(Std. dev.)
HKEx
1126
0.191
46
0.909
(16.981)
(3.339)
SSE
743
0.738
45
1.071
(11.004)
(2.067)
SZSE
719
0.599
38
0.905
(1.857)
(2.988)
1

Note: The left panel reports the number of firms publicly traded on the HKEx (main board), the SSE
(A-share market) and the SZSE (main board and A-share market) up until December 31, 2009, together
with the median and standard deviation of market capitalization at the end of 2009. The right panel
reports the same statistics for the sample of publicly traded real estate firms that is adopted in this
paper.
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Table 1.3: Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of Real Estate Firms
By Stock Exchange

CAR[−20, k]
[-20,-10]
[-20,-6]
[-20,-5]
[-20,-4]
[-20,-3]
[-20,-2]
[-20,-1]
[-20, 0]
[-20,1]
[-20,2]
[-20,3]
[-20,4]
[-20,5]
[-20,10]
N
1

All Real
Estate Firms
(1)
0.000
(0.009)
-0.014
(0.011)
-0.019
(0.011)
−0.027∗
(0.011)
−0.062∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.060∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.065∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.070∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.076∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.100∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.141∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.143∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.155∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.131∗∗∗
(0.015)

HKEX
(2)
-0.008
(0.018)
-0.004
(0.022)
0.001
(0.023)
-0.007
(0.023)
-0.030
(0.024)
-0.046
(0.025)
0.051∗
(0.025)
−0.056∗
(0.026)
−0.065∗∗
(0.026)
−0.078∗∗∗
(0.027)
−0.110∗∗∗
(0.028)
−0.111∗∗∗
(0.028)
−0.104∗∗∗
(0.029)
−0.124∗∗∗
(0.031)

129
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Mainland
(SSE & SZSE)
(3)
0.004
(0.009)
-0.019
(0.011)
−0.031∗∗
(0.012)
−0.038∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.080∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.068∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.072∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.078∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.083∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.113∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.159∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.160∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.183∗∗∗
(0.015)
−0.135∗∗∗
(0.016)
83

Note: Average cumulative abnormal returns over event windows
[−20, k] and their asymptotic standard errors are reported in cells.
For space reasons, only selected k’s are displayed. The complete
schedule of CAR[−20, k] is plotted in Figure 1.4. I test the null hypothesis of no abnormal return among real estate firms on average.
The null hypothesis being rejected at significance levels 5%, 2% and
1% is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ , respectively.
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Table 1.4: Average CAR of Real Estate Firms: Alternative Event Windows
Event Window: [−20, k]

Event Window: [−10, k]

Event Window: [−5, k]

CAR[−20, k]

CAR[−10, k]

CAR[−5, k]

[-20,-10]
[-20,-7]
[-20,-6]
[-20,-5]
[-20,-4]
[-20,-3]
[-20,-2]
[-20,-1]
[-20, 0]
[-20,1]
[-20,2]
[-20,3]
[-20,4]
[-20,5]
[-20,10]
N
1

0.000
(0.009)
-0.009
(0.010)
-0.014
(0.011)
-0.019
(0.011)
−0.027∗
(0.011)
−0.062∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.060∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.065∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.070∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.076∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.100∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.141∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.143∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.155∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.131∗∗∗
(0.015)
129

–

–

[-10,-7]

-0.007
(0.006)
-0.012
(0.007)
−0.016∗
(0.007)
−0.025∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.061∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.060∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.064∗∗∗
(0.009)
−0.070∗∗∗
(0.009)
−0.075∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.099∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.139∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.140∗∗∗
(0.011)
−0.151∗∗∗
(0.011)
−0.128∗∗∗
(0.013)

[-10,-6]
[-10,-5]
[-10,-4]
[-10,-3]
[-10,-2]
[-10,-1]
[-10,0]
[-10,1]
[-10,2]
[-10,3]
[-10,4]
[-10,5]
[-10,10]
N

129

–
–
[-5,-5]
[-5,-4]
[-5, -3]
[-5,-2]
[-5,-1]
[-5,0]
[-5,1]
[-5,2]
[-5,3]
[-5,4]
[-5,5]

-0.005
(0.003)
−0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.046∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.044∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.048∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.053∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.058∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.081∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.120∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.121∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.133∗∗∗
(0.009)

–
N

129

Note: This table compares average cumulative abnormal returns of the 129 real estate firms calculated
using various event windows: [−20, k], [−10, k] and [−5, k]. The null hypothesis being rejected at
significance levels 5%, 2% and 1% is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ , respectively.
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Table 1.5: Average CAR of Real Estate Firms: Time-Shifted Placebo Events
Backward Placebo Events

Forward Placebo Events

Placebo Dates

CAR[−2, 2]

Placebo Dates CAR[−2, 2]

Day -20

0.008
(0.006)
0.008
(0.006)
0.005
(0.008)
0.006
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.006)
0.007
(0.007)

Day 20

Day -30
Day -40
Day -50
Day -100
Day -150
N
1

Day 30
Day 40
Day 50
Day 100
Day 150

129

N

0.000
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.006)
−0.013∗
(0.006)
−0.013∗
(0.006)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.006
(0.006)
129

Note: Average 5-day cumulative abnormal returns around placebo events and
the asymptotic standard errors are reported. Placebo event dates are represented
by the relative trading day to the announcement of the April policy intervention. The null hypothesis being rejected at significance levels 5%, 2% and 1% is
denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ , respectively.
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Table 1.6: Average Cumulative Abnormal Return of Non-Real-Estate Firms Publicly Traded on HKEx
Industrial
CAR[−20, k]
(1)

Textile
(2)

Food&Beverage
(3)

Materials
(4)

Mining
(5)

Communication
(6)

Service
(7)

Energy
(8)

[-20,-10]

0.017
(0.015)
0.025
(0.019)
0.021
(0.021)
0.032
(0.022)
0.034
(0.023)
0.039
(0.024)
0.044
(0.026)

-0.003
(0.019)
-0.005
(0.025)
-0.009
(0.027)
0.002
(0.028)
-0.003
(0.030)
0.007
(0.031)
0.007
(0.034)

0.001
(0.019)
-0.021
(0.024)
-0.032
(0.026)
-0.030
(0.028)
-0.032
(0.029)
-0.027
(0.031)
-0.039
(0.034)

-0.005
(0.021)
0.011
(0.029)
0.002
(0.031)
-0.007
(0.033)
-0.016
(0.034)
-0.005
(0.036)
-0.022
(0.040)

-0.028
(0.039)
0.011
(0.051)
0.024
(0.055)
0.027
(0.058)
0.021
(0.060)
0.027
(0.064)
0.020
(0.070)

0.041
(0.035)
0.047
(0.046)
0.035
(0.050)
0.048
(0.052)
0.026
(0.054)
0.042
(0.058)
0.058
(0.063)

-0.013
(0.021)
-0.013
(0.028)
-0.039
(0.030)
-0.044
(0.031)
-0.061
(0.033)
-0.052
(0.035)
-0.073
(0.038)

-0.021
(0.022)
-0.005
(0.028)
-0.013
(0.030)
-0.021
(0.032)
-0.009
(0.033)
-0.003
(0.036)
0.008
(0.039)

121

64
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53

19

14

32

51

[-20,-5]
[-20,-2]
51

[-20, 0]
[-20,2]
[-20,5]
[-20,10]
N
1
2

The placebo analysis employs companies in eight randomly-selected industries according to the Hang Seng Industry Classification.
Average cumulative abnormal returns over event windows [−20, k] and their asymptotic errors are reported at a 5-day interval.
The null hypothesis being rejected at significance levels 5%, 2% and 1% is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ , respectively.

Table 1.7: Average Cumulative Abnormal Return of Non-Real Estate Firms Publicly Traded on the SSE and SZSE

Agriculture
CAR[−20, k]
(1)
[-20,-10]
[-20,-5]
[-20,-2]

52

[-20, 0]
[-20,2]
[-20,5]
[-20,10]
N
1

2

Manufacturing
Petrochemicals Machinery Utilities
(4)
(5)
(6)

Mining
(2)

Textile
(3)

−0.043∗∗∗
(0.014)
-0.033
(0.017)
−0.043∗
(0.019)
-0.016
(0.020)
-0.011
(0.021)
0.020
(0.022)
0.042
(0.024)

0.007
(0.012)
0.020
(0.015)
0.028
(0.016)
0.038∗
(0.017)
0.017
(0.018)
0.019
(0.019)
0.049∗
(0.022)

-0.004
(0.010)
-0.008
(0.012)
-0.004
(0.013)
0.000
(0.014)
0.004
(0.014)
0.011
(0.015)
-0.006
(0.019)

0.004
(0.007)
0.005
(0.009)
-0.013
(0.011)
-0.009
(0.011)
-0.014
(0.013)
-0.006
(0.013)
-0.017
(0.014)

0.001
(0.001)
0.011
(0.011)
0.012
(0.012)
0.017
(0.017)
0.021
(0.021)
0.034
(0.034)
0.032
(0.032)

30

51

58

111

52

Social Services
(7)

Communication
(8)

-0.012
(0.009)
-0.007
(0.011)
-0.013
(0.012)
-0.009
(0.012)
-0.008
(0.013)
-0.007
(0.014)
0.000
(0.016)

0.015
(0.011)
0.010
(0.014)
0.008
(0.015)
0.007
(0.016)
0.015
(0.017)
0.033
(0.018)
0.042∗
(0.019)

0.011
(0.020)
0.017
(0.025)
0.023
(0.027)
0.014
(0.029)
0.005
(0.030)
0.039
(0.032)
0.047
(0.036)

69

46

15

The placebo analysis employs companies in eight randomly-chosen industries. According to the CSRC (China Security Regulatory Commission)
Industry Classification rules, these eight industries are Agriculture, Forestry, Livestock Farming, Fishery (A), Mining (B), Textile and Apparel
(C1), Petrochemicals (C4), Common Machines Manufacturing (C71), Utilities (D), Social Services (K) and Communication (L).
Average cumulative abnormal returns over event windows [−20, k] and their asymptotic errors are reported at a 5-day interval. The null
hypothesis being rejected at significance levels 5%, 2% and 1% is denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ , respectively.

Table 1.8: Floor Area Sold of Residential Properties, 35 Major Chinese Cities
(in million square meters)
25
75th
Percentile Median Percentile
th

1

Year

Mean

Std. Dev.

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

2.42
2.92
3.50
4.28
5.07
7.04
7.22
8.76
6.55
9.96
9.38
9.28

2.73
3.29
3.96
4.63
6.59
6.53
5.96
7.54
5.33
7.91
7.36
7.50

0.66
0.90
1.06
1.67
1.89
2.42
3.17
3.82
3.26
4.43
4.46
4.44

1.90
1.90
2.30
2.91
3.09
5.37
5.83
6.68
5.17
7.60
7.86
7.69

2.90
3.53
3.75
4.63
5.09
8.95
9.09
10.65
8.02
12.54
12.10
11.69

N

35

35

35

35

35

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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Table 1.9: Description of Publicly Traded Real Estate Firms
By Firm Type
All
Firms
(1)

Private
Firms
(2)

Central StateControlled
(3)

Local StateControlled
(4)

13.00
(18.72)
0.341
(.503)
0.146
(.151)

9.16
(10.84)
0.356
(.552)
0.136
(.171)

39.60
(41.19)
0.143
(.336)
0.142
(.105)

10.86
(8.74)
0.382
(.449)
0.167
(.124)

1.801
(1.699)
.333
(.563)

1.825
(1.937)
.29
(.396)

2.276
(2.235)
.42
(.298)

1.596
(.842)
.379
(.831)

97
32

53
21

11
3

33
8

Speculative Markets

101

55

12

34

Number of Firms

129

74

14

41

Panel A: Financial Metrics
Market Capitalization
(in Billion Chinese Yuan)
Leverage
Return on Equity
Panel B: Growth Rate (2008-2009)
Growth Rate of Market Capitalization
Growth Rate of Total Asset
Panel C: Property Exposure
(Number of Firms in cell)
Residential-Oriented
With Non-Residential Concentration
Panel D: Geographical Exposure
(Number of Firms in cell)

1

Note: Financial metrics at the end of 2009 are summarized in Panel A. Panel B shows the appreciation
of firm market value and book value during the 2008-2009 stimulus period. Non-residential real estate
concentration and geographical exposure in the ten speculative markets are described in Panel C and
D.
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Table 1.10: Policy Impact and Firm Attributes: Baseline Estimates
Dependent Variable: CARi [−20, 5]
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

Non-Residential Real Estate

0.042∗∗∗
(0.015)

0.040∗∗∗
(0.015)

0.030∗∗
(0.012)

0.030∗∗
(0.012)

0.026∗∗
(0.011)

Speculative Markets

-0.049
(0.031)

-0.043
(0.031)

-0.045
(0.029)

−0.047∗
(0.028)

−0.041∗
(0.024)

−0.074∗∗∗
(0.026)

−0.054∗
(0.029)

−0.049∗
(0.025)

-0.022
(0.026)

-0.012
(0.024)

-0.030
(0.020)

Central State-Controlled
Local State-Controlled
State-Controlled Shares

-0.012
(0.049)

State-controlled Shares×
Central State-Controlled

-0.088
(0.065)

Constant
Stock market dummies
Other firm-level Covariates
Trimmed sample
N
R-Squared
1

Y
Y
N
N

Y
Y
N
N

Y
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

129
0.176

129
0.214

129
0.257

129
0.254

124
0.310

Note: This table reports results from estimating Equation (1.3). CARs are calculated in Section
1.4.3. “Non-Residential Real Estate” and “Speculative Markets” are indicators of whether firms
have concentrations in non-residential properties and whether firms develop housing properties
in speculative markets. “Central State-Controlled” and “Local State-Controlled” are indicators
of firms with various types of political connections. Private firm is the omitted category here.
Column (3) represents the baseline specification where the full set of other firm-level covariates
(firm size, leverage, profitability) are included. Column (4) employs a continuous measure of
political connections – “State-Controlled Shares”, which equals to the % share of the largest
shareholder if the firm is state-controlled, and 0 if the firm is privately owned. The interaction
of “State-Controlled Shares” and being a central state-controlled firm is also included in column
(4). Column (5) is the same regression as column (3) but done on a trimmed sample where
firms with the top and bottom 2% CAR[−20, 5] are dropped. Bootstrapped standard errors
are reported. Significant levels 10%, 5% and 1% are indicated by ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ , respectively.
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Table 1.11: Policy Impact and Firm Attributes: Omitted Variable Bias
Dependent Variable: CARi [−20, 5]
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.030∗∗
(0.012)
-0.045
(0.029)
−0.054∗
(0.029)
-0.012
(0.024)

Non-Residential Real Estate
Speculative Markets
Central State-Controlled
Local State-Controlled
Growth of Market Cap (2008-2009)

0.025∗∗
(0.013)
−0.056∗
(0.029)
−0.050∗
(0.027)
-0.009
(0.025)
-0.011
(0.011)

−0.042∗∗
(0.017)

Growth of Total Asset (2008-2009)
Constant
Stock market dummies
Other firm-level Covariates
N
R-Squared
1

0.031∗∗
(0.012)
−0.052∗
(0.027)
−0.049∗
(0.028)
-0.009
(0.024)

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

129
0.257

126
0.311

129
0.305

Note: This table reports results from estimating Equation (1.3). Column (1) is
the baseline specification as Column (3) of Table 1.10. Column (2) controls for the
growth rate of firm market capitalization from 2008 to 2009. Column (3) controls for
the growth rate of firm total asset during the same period. Bootstrapped standard
errors are reported. Significant levels 10%, 5% and 1% are indicated by ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ ,
respectively.
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Table 1.12: Policy Impact and Firm Attributes: Alternative Event Windows
CAR over Various Event Windows
[-20,5]
[-20,3]
[-20,4]
[-20,10]
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Non-Residential Real Estate
Speculative Markets
Central State-Controlled
Local State-Controlled
Constant
Stock market dummies
Other firm-level Co-variates
N
R-squared
1

0.030∗∗
(0.012)
-0.045
(0.029)
−0.054∗
(0.028)
-0.012
(0.023)

0.021∗∗
(0.010)
-0.026
(0.025)
−0.069∗∗
(0.028)
-0.021
(0.021)

0.030∗∗∗
(0.011)
-0.031
(0.026)
−0.061∗∗
(0.025)
-0.015
(0.022)

0.056∗∗
(0.023)
-0.038
(0.031)
−0.053∗
(0.031)
-0.009
(0.028)

[-10,5]
(5)
0.025∗∗
(0.011)
-0.027
(0.023)
−0.045∗
(0.027)
-0.008
(0.020)

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

129
0.268

125
0.273

129
0.235

127
0.218

129
0.325

Note: This table reports estimation of the benchmark specification using cumulative abnormal
returns calculated over various event windows as the dependent variables. Column (1) is the same
regression as column (3) of Table 1.10. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported. Significant
levels 10%, 5% and 1% are indicated by ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ , respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Minimum Down Payment Requirement
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[1] The three discrete changes in minimum down payment rules represent the three housing
policy interventions in April 2010, September 2010 and January 2011.
[2] Minimum down payment requirement for a third-home purchase (not plotted here) is
greater than or equal to that for a second-home purchase. The September 2010 policy
required banks to suspend loans for third-home purchases.
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Figure 1.2: Time Line of the Announcement of “Document Number 10”

(01/01/2009) Day -324

Start of the estimation period

Day -20

(04/09/2010) Day -4
(04/12/2010) Day -3
Event Window

Estimation Period

(04/08/2010) Day -5

Beginning of the Boao Forum for Asia
04/11/2010: The Chairman of China’s Banking
Regulatory Committee mentioned tightening mortgage
policies for speculators at the Boao Forum.

(04/13/2010) Day -2
(04/14/2010) Day -1
(04/15/2010) Day 0
(04/16/2010) Day 1
(04/19/2010) Day 2

Major content of the “Document Number 10” was announced
to the public by the Premier of China
04/17/2010: Official release of “Document Number 10”
to the public

Day 20

Note: The time line of information disclosure is collected from the Xinhua News Agency
(www.xinhua.org), which is the most authoritative media channel in China through which
major news is released to the public. 1
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Figure 1.3: The Real Estate Climate Index of China

Note: This index is available from the National Bureau of Statistics, calculated on a monthly
basis from real esate investment, development and sales data. A reading above 100 indicates
good conditions, while one below that level indicates bad conditions. The vertical line
represents March 2010 (right before the announcement of “Document Number 10”).
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Figure 1.4: Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of Real Estate Firms
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Note: Corresponding to column (1) in Table 1.3, average cumulative abnormal return for
all 129 real estate firms, CAR[−20, k] and its 95% confidence intervals are plotted over k.
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Figure 1.5: Average CAR of Real Estate Firms, by Stock Exchange
(b) Mainland (SSE&SZSE)

-.2
-.3

-.3

-.2

CAR[-20,k]
-.1
0
.1

CAR[-20,k]
0
-.1
.1

.2

.2

(a) HKEx

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

k

k

Number of Companies: 46

Number of Companies: 83

10

15

20

10

15

20

(b2) SZSE

-.3

-.3

-.2

-.2

CAR[-20,k]
-.1
0
.1

CAR[-20,k]
-.1
.1
0

.2

.2

(b1) SSE

5

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

k

k

Number of Companies: 45

Number of Companies: 38

5

Note: Analogous to Figure 1.4, average cumulative abnormal return is plotted for real estate
firms publicly traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (4a) and the two mainland stock
exchanges (4b), corresponding to columns (2) and (3) in Table 1.3. The bottom two figures
plot the average CAR for the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, respectively.
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Figure 1.6: Average CAR of Non-Real-Estate Firms Listed on the HKEx
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Note: Average cumulative abnormal return, CAR[−20, k] and its 95% confidence intervals
are plotted over k for each of the eight randomly-chosen industries listed on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange.
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Figure 1.7: Average CAR of Non-Real-Estate Firms Listed on the SSE and SZSE
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Note: Average cumulative abnormal return, CAR[−20, k] and its 95% confidence intervals
are plotted over k for each of the eight randomly-chosen industries listed on the Shanghai
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.
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Figure 1.8: Implied Change in Expected House Price Appreciation
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Note: This figure plots the simulated change in expected house price appreciation after
the announcement of “Document Number 10”. This exercise is based on Equation (2) and
assumptions in Section 1.5.2. The horizontal axis represents expected house price growth
before the policy announcement. I assume discount rate r = 0.1 and expected years of firm
operation T = 5, 10, 15, 20. Various choices of discount rate (ranging from 0.05 to 0.15)
leads to similar results.
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Figure 1.9: Floor Area Sold in Selected Speculative Markets (2000-2011)
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Note: This figure plots the total floor area of residential properties sold in each of the five
speculative markets, available from the National Bureau of Statistics. See Section 1.6.1.2
for the definition of “speculative markets” in this paper. Two city names are screened for
confidential reasons.
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Figure 1.10: Point Estimates over the Course of Policy Announcement
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Note: Figures 1.10 plot the coefficients on the two variables for firms’ business exposure in
non-residential real estate and speculative markets over k when equation (1.3) is sequentially
estimated using CAR[−20, k] as the dependent variable (k ∈ [−20, 10], k ∈ Z). The 95%
confidence intervals are plotted around the point estimates. All the regressions use the
baseline specification from column (3) in Table 1.10.
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Figure 1.11: Point Estimates over the Course of Policy Announcement (Cont’d)
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Note: Figure 1.11 plot the coefficients on the two variables for political connections (Central SOE and Local SOE) over k when equation (1.3) is sequentially estimated using
CAR[−20, k] as the dependent variable (k ∈ [−20, 10], k ∈ Z). The 95% confidence intervals
are plotted around the point estimates. All the regressions use the baseline specification
from column (3) in Table 1.10.
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Appendix Table 1.A: Outline of the State Council “Document Number 10”
I. Local governments and bureaus should fulfill the responsibility of stabilizing local house prices and promoting housing affordability
(1) Local governments and bureaus should carry out the central government policies to curb excessive appreciation of house prices
(2) A system will be established to assess and evaluate how local governments fulfill these housing-related tasks
II. To curb speculative demand for housing
(3) For second-home purchases, banks should impose a minimum down
payment rate of 50% and a mortgage rate of at least 110% of the
base rate. Banks may suspend loans to third-home purchases, and
should stop lending to non-resident home purchasers who have not
paid taxes in that city for at least 1 year
(4) To raise taxes to restrict speculative housing transactions
III. To increase effective supply of housing
(5) To guarantee the effective supply of land for residential use
(6) To guarantee the supply of moderate-sized housing units. At least
70% of the residential land supply should be designated for the
construction of affordable and moderate-sized housing units, and
the renovation of shanty towns
IV. To speed up the construction of government-subsidized housing
(7) To construct 3 million government-subsidized housing units and 2.8
million renovated units (from shanty towns) nationwide in 2010
V. To tighten supervision of the housing market
(8) To punish violators of housing and land market regulations; banks
are urged to tighten lending criteria for real estate firms
(9) To punish misbehavior in housing transactions
(10) To promote information disclosure and set up housing transaction
database
1

2

Source: the State Council “Guowuyuan guanyu jianjue ezhi bufen chengshi fangjia guokuai
shangzhang de tongzhi ” [Notice of the State Council to Resolutely Curb the Rapid Rise
in House Prices in Some Cities], Guofa[2010], No.10.
The official document is available in Chinese at the website of the central government:
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-04/17/content_1584927.htm.
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Appendix Figure 1.A: Average CAR of Real Estate Firms: other Policy Events
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Note: Average cumulative abnormal return for all real estate companies, CAR[−10, k] and
its 95% confidence intervals are plotted over k. Four major housing policy announcements
from 2008 to 2011 are examined here. Plot (ii) refers to the State Council “Document
Number 10”.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Contagion in the Last
American Housing Cycle
(With Anthony DeFusco, Fernando Ferreira and Joseph Gyourko)
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2.1

Introduction

One of the striking features of the recent U.S. housing cycle is its heterogeneity
across markets. Both the magnitudes and timing of price swings varied greatly across
metropolitan areas (Sinai (2012)). Figure 2.1 plots the geography and timing of the
start of housing booms at the metropolitan area level from 1993 to 2009 based on
estimates reported in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011).1 The top left panel marks the 15
primarily rust belt and interior markets that never boomed. The other panels show
that the remaining markets boomed at very different times over a nearly decade-long
period from 1997 to 2005. The housing boom spread from what were initially highly
concentrated areas on the two coasts, with the earliest booms beginning between
1997-1999 in California and the mid-New England region. On the west coast, housing
booms eventually spread inland towards central California and to neighboring states
to the east and north. On the east coast, housing booms spread to other markets in
New England and then to neighboring regions, eventually reaching the majority of
Florida markets by 2004 and 2005. These patterns are suggestive of spillover effects
that disseminate positive housing price changes from one market to another.
In this paper we investigate whether contagion was an important element of the
last American housing cycle and also directly test which mechanisms are driving the
price contagion. In the financial economics literature, a spillover is often referred to
as contagion when it is found following a negative shock to one or more countries or
markets.2 While we focus on spillovers from a positive shock in much of this paper, we
use the terms spillover and contagion interchangeably in order to emphasize the close
1

They define the beginning of a metropolitan area’s housing boom by the quarter in which there
is a structural break (a discrete positive jump in this case) in that market’s house price appreciation
rate. This methodology and the rationale behind it are discussed more fully below in Section 2.2.
2
See Forbes (2012) for an excellent recent review of that literature, and Dungey, et. al. (2005) for
a more technical analysis of the challenges involved in convincingly estimating contagion or spillover
effects. Previous work on financial market contagion includes studies of the 1987 U.S. stock market
crash (King and Wadhwani (1990); Lee and Kim (1993)), the 1994 Mexican peso crisis (Calvart and
Reinhart (1996)), and the Hong Kong stock market and Asian currency crisis of 1997 (Corsetti, et.
al. (2005)).
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intellectual linkage of our work with the analysis of contagion in financial economics.
To be precise, we define contagion as the price correlation across space between two
different housing markets following a shock to one market that is above and beyond
what can be justified by common aggregate trends.3
We address several empirical concerns that plague previous contagion-related research. One example involves the determination of the relevant period(s) in which to
study contagion or spillovers. A non-ad hoc procedure for identifying the timing of a
shock would be preferred to an arbitrary choice of a time period ‘after the fact’. This
typically is not feasible in most studies of stock market or currency crises because
there is little or no variation across countries in the onset of those events. We deal
with such problem by appealing to urban economic theory (Glaeser et al.’s (2012)
dynamic version of the classic model of spatial equilibrium) to help define when the
boom begins in each metropolitan area. As is described more fully in the next section,
this leads us to date the beginning of a given market’s boom by whether and when
there was a structural break in that area’s price appreciation rate. These estimates,
as shown in Figure 2.1, provide substantial variation in the timing of the start of local
market booms.
A second advantage is provided by the use of a voluminous micro-level data on
U.S. housing transactions.4 We have over 23 million observations on individual home
sales in 99 metropolitan areas dating back to the early 1990s in most cases. This
data enables us to address specification search bias of the type identified by Leamer
(1978), which arises when the same data is used to identify both the timing of a shock
and the magnitude of the volatility during that period. Our strategy uses randomly
split samples to separately identify the timing of booms and the magnitude of price
3

While there is no single, agreed-upon definition of contagion, this definition is similar in spirit to
many used in the financial economics literature. See, for example, Forbes (2012), which emphasizes
the distinction between contagion and interdependence, with the latter term reflecting when events
in one country affect others in all states of the world, not just after severe negative events.
4
The property transaction data is collected by DataQuick or by intermediaries from county
assessor’s offices and contains a population of all home sales.
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volatility in those periods.5 Most contagion studies in financial economics are not
able to deal with this issue because they use a single aggregate stock index in each
country. Doing so increases the likelihood of falsely concluding that there are more
and bigger booms (or crisis periods) than truly exist.
Third, the richness of our data and the variation in the timing of booms across
markets also helps us deal with omitted variable biases in several ways. As is explained
more fully later in the paper, we use the time line of a neighbor’s boom as our source of
variation in the data to identify contagion effects. Our baseline specification involves
regressing a focal market’s price changes on a series of indicators reflecting whether
the relevant neighboring market is booming and how proximate in time a given market
is to the start of that market’s boom.6 The added degrees of freedom afforded by
the multiple, non-contemporaneous booms we observe also allow us to control for
omitted factors that might reflect common economic shocks. We do so through the
inclusion of time by census division dummies, lagged price changes, as well as a
host of local fundamentals. We also are able to address the Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) critique regarding heteroskedasticity, whereby increased volatility in the ‘crisis
period’ (when the boom starts, in our context) generates upward bias in correlation
coefficients across markets. We adjust for the volatility in prices being higher than
normal when the boom starts by directly controlling for the time line of the focal
market’s boom. Finally, in an alternative specification, we also address the potential
for reverse causality with an instrumental variable approach using further lags of close
neighbor’s price changes.
In addition to these improvements in empirical implementation, we directly estimate the importance of several potential mechanisms that could be driving any ob5

This is the same strategy followed by Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008) in their study of tipping
points in residential segregation models.
6
As expected, this is very important empirically. Naively regressing ‘price on price’ yields contagion estimates that are 3-5 times larger than the results we report below from our preferred
specification.
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served contagion. Specifically, we investigate the impact of closest neighbor’s housing
boom on the average income of potential home buyers, behavior of lenders, migration, and speculative activity in the focal MSA.7 Moreover, we test whether those
mechanisms and other local fundamentals – and expectations of local fundamentals –
can explain the magnitude of the contagion effect. Such exercise is relevant since the
current literature emphasizes the importance of behavioral factors in the last housing
boom.8
Our main conclusion is that contagion played a statistically and economically
significant role in the development of the most recent housing boom. The elasticity
of prices in a typical focal market with respect to those in the closest metropolitan
area in the year following the beginning of the boom in that neighboring area ranges
from 0.10 to 0.27.9 Empirically, the upper end of our elasticity range implies that
from one-fourth to one-third of the average jump in price growth at the start of a
typical local boom was due to contagion effects. This average impact is driven entirely
by the physically closest neighbor – and is only detected if the nearest neighbor had
a statistically significant housing boom. There is no evidence of spillovers on prices
arising from more geographically distant markets. In addition, this impact does not
vary materially with the number of miles between the focal market and its nearest
neighbor.10 As an additional robustness, we also find evidence of contagion on the
7
The finance literature has also investigated the channels of contagion in the context of currency or
stock market crises via international trade, financial institutions and portfolio investors, for example.
See Forbes (2012) for a good review on that thread of literature.
8
See, for example, Case and Shiller (2003) and Case, Shiller and Thompson (2012).
9
We also report evidence of on-going contagion effects as the boom builds, but those results are
potentially confounded by feedback effects. This is not a concern at the start of local booms because
the data show no pre-trends, with markets appearing to be on their equilibrium paths before the
initial jump in price growth when the booms commenced.
10
We also employed an economic measure of distance based on migration flows between metropolitan areas that has been used in other research (Sinai and Souleles (2009)). It is strongly positively
correlated with geographic distance between markets. For example, the probability of the physically
closest neighbor also being the closest economic neighbor is 57%, and the probability it is one of the
two closest economic neighbors is 76%. Hence, it is not surprising these two measures of distance
yield similar results. Consequently, we do not report those regression findings for space reasons, but
do discuss the rare exceptions when different findings result from use of the two different distance
metrics.
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extensive margin. Hazard models show that the probability of a boom beginning this
quarter is indeed influenced by close metros that boomed in the previous quarter.
We also investigated heterogeneity in the price contagion along a number of other
non-distance related dimensions. For example, one might expect contagion to be
stronger when the transmission is from larger neighbor to a smaller focal market.
That is precisely what we find. Contagion also varies with the elasticity of supply of
the metropolitan area. Specifically, there is no evidence of contagion in inelastically
supplied markets, but the estimated impact in the most elastically supplied markets
is double the average effect discussed above.11 As an additional robustness test, we
also find contagion in the extensive margin – hazard models show that the probability
of a boom beginning this quarter is indeed influenced by close metros that boomed
last quarter.
What mechanisms explain the price contagion effect? Fundamental factors of the
focal MSA, including local incomes, migration flows, lending behavior, and speculative behavior, do not show much variation after the beginning of the boom of the
nearest neighbor. We also include a simple form of expectations of these local market fundamentals in our main econometric model to see if this materially affects the
magnitude of the estimated contagion effect. It does not. This indicates that at least
some of the contagion we estimate may be due to forces not related to the fundamentals analyzed in this paper. This has potentially important implications for policy
makers. To the extent that the spread of a housing boom is even partially due to nonfundamental forces (e.g., some type of irrational exuberance or otherwise mistaken
perceptions of the influence of a neighboring market), it may be worth rethinking the
advisability of not responding to a boom.
11

This particular heterogeneity certainly should not be given any causal interpretation, as it turns
out that a large fraction of markets in inelastic supply are large relatively to their neighbors, for
example. Nevertheless, the result of contagion playing an immaterial role in inelastically supplied
markets is consistent with prior findings in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), which showed that the
household income of mortgage applicants jumps enough to account for virtually all of the initial
booms in those markets.
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Despite finding important spillovers during the U.S. housing boom, we report
mixed evidence that contagion played a role in the bust. Estimated elasticities are
zero at the beginning of the bust, but they increase to about 0.15 by the third year
of the housing bust of the nearest neighbor. We also cannot detect any impact of
contagion on the extensive margin during the bust. This is perhaps not all that
surprising since the timing of the bust across MSAs is heavily concentrated in an 18
month period during 2006 and 2007, while the buildup of the housing boom took
almost a decade. This highlights difficulties in detecting spillovers during economic
or financial crashes/booms that quickly spread across countries, regions, or firms.12
While our research is motivated by prior research in financial economics,13 it
is also part of the growing body of work on the most recent housing cycle. One
important strand of that research tries to understand whether the most recent cycle
was a bubble.14 Another more voluminous body of papers analyzes the bust and its
consequences.15 There are also some prior studies of price spillovers in the housing
12

In addition, we do not have the added advantage of relying on a prediction from external theory
to date the beginning of the bust. In this part of the analysis, we follow the tradition in the contagion
literature and date the bust’s beginning in an ad hoc manner based on the assumption that it begins
in the quarter after nominal price levels peaked in a given metropolitan area.
13
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) define contagion as a “significant increase in cross-market linkages
after a shock to one [market].” Others have used this definition (or something similar) to study
financial contagion in many contexts including the 1987 U.S. stock market crash (King and Wadhwani, 1990; Lee and Kim, 1993), the 1994 Mexican peso crises (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996), and
the Hong Kong stock market crisis of 1997 (Corsetti et al., 2005).
14
Shiller (Chapter 2, 2005) provides perhaps the most famous characterization of the boom as a
non-rational event. Others recently have estimated rational expectations general equilibrium models
to try to explain the national aggregate price data (e.g., Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2011)) or the serial correlation and volatility of prices and quantities within and across metropolitan
areas (e.g., Glaeser et al. (2012)). Related work includes Arce and Lopez-Salido (2011), Burnside,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), Lai and Van Order (2010), and Wheaton and Nechayev (2008).
15
Much of this research focuses on the subprime sector (e.g., Bajari, Chu and Park (2008),
Danis and Pennington-Cross (2008), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), Gerardi, Shapiro and
Willen (2007), Goetzmann, Peng and Yen (2009). Mayer and Pence (2008), Haughwout, et. al.
(2011)), mortgage securitization (e.g., Bubb and Kaufman (2009), Keys et. al. (2010)), the default/foreclosure crisis (e.g., Adelino, Gerardi and Willen (2009), Campbell, Giglio and Pathak
(forthcoming), Foote, Gerardi and Willen (2008), Gerardi et. al. (2008), Mayer, Pence and Sherlund (2009), Mian and Sufi (2009), Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010), Piskorski, Seru and Vig (2009))
or the role of government regulation (e.g., Avery and Brevoort (2010), Bhutta (2009), Ho and
Pennington-Cross (2008)).

77

market.16 In this paper, we focus on one particular facet of the cycle, the role of
contagion, but contributed to the literature by: (a) looking at contagion over the
full time span of the cycle; (b) improving empirical identification in many respects;
(c) estimating heterogeneity in the contagion elasticity; and (d) investigating the
potential causes of contagion across housing markets.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section motivates our use of an
urban economic approach to analyzing contagion in housing markets and discusses
our method for dating the beginning of the boom. Section 2.3 describes the various
data sources employed and the variables created. Section 2.4 discusses the different
types of specifications estimated, reports results, and explores potential mechanisms
that might explain the contagion effects. In Section 2.5 we look at alternative specifications, the extensive margin of contagion and whether we can find contagion at the
housing bust. There is a brief conclusion.

2.2

An Urban Economic Motivation and Definition of Contagion

2.2.1

Timing of Local Housing Booms

Any analysis of possible contagion effects in the spreading of the recent housing
boom first requires knowledge of the timing of the beginning of the boom in different
16
Some early examples include Clapp, et al. (1995) and Dolde and Tirtiroglu (1997), who use data
on towns in Connecticut and San Francisco (respectively) to test for the existence of cross-market
linkages in price movements. More recently, Holly, et al. (2010, 2011) use data on U.S. states and
U.K. regions to study the spatial and temporal diffusion of changes in house prices during the most
recent cycle. Fuss, et. al. (2011) and Cotter, et. al. (2011) use publicly available, metropolitan arealevel house price series to test for the existence of some form of contagion during the most recent
housing cycle. However, all studies use the same aggregate market-level price data to determine
both the timing of the crisis period and to measure the magnitude of volatility changes during that
period, which makes their estimates susceptible to specification search bias. In addition, the timing
of the shock is usually defined in an ad-hoc way and there are questions about how that research
deals with omitted factors.
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markets. Our data on the time line of local booms come from estimates reported in
Ferreira and Gyourko (2011). In that work, the start of local booms is determined
by when there was a structural break in each area’s price appreciation rate series.
The justification for that strategy is based on implications of the dynamic spatial
equilibrium model developed in Glaeser, et al. (2012).17 In particular, that model
implies that in steady state each local market will exhibit constant and continuous
growth paths for house prices, new construction and population.18 Empirically, this
means that we should see house prices in a given market growing at a constant rate
unless there is a shock to local productivity or amenities, in which case we would
then observe a discrete jump in the appreciation rate for that market. The data
are consistent with this predicted pattern, as illustrated in Figure 2.2’s depiction of
house price appreciation rates over time for the Las Vegas market. This graph, which
is taken from Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), shows that fast-growing market to be
appreciating at a high, but roughly constant rate, for many years before house price
growth escalates sharply at the beginning of its boom. Informally, we take the point
at which house price growth rates exhibit this discrete jump to be the beginning of
the housing boom.
The temporal distribution of the quarter in which booms began in all 99 MSAs in
our sample was plotted in Figure 2.1. While we refer interested readers to Ferreira and
Gyourko (2011) for the details of the formal procedure underpinning these estimates,
a very brief summary is as follows. We start with the following reduced form model
17

Glaeser, et al. (2012) introduce dynamics into Rosen’s (1979) and Roback’s (1982) classic static
model of spatial equilibrium. In this compensating differential framework, house prices (Pi ) are the
entry fee paid to access the wages (Wi , which reflect productivity) and amenities (Ai ) of labor market
area i. Their model is closed with an assumption that there is some elastically supplied reference
market area which is always open to another household. The utility level available in the reference
market is given by U ∗ , and establishes the lower bound on utility provided in any market. In the
long run, perfect mobility ensures that U ∗ is achieved in all markets, so that in equilibrium, no one
has an incentive to move to another place which offers higher utility. A very simple, linear version
of this framework would imply that U ∗ = Wi + Ai − Pi , so that dPi = dWi + dAi in equilibrium.
18
The steady state rate of price appreciation need not be zero. Secular trends in house prices can
come from an underlying trend in housing demand as long as the market is not in perfectly elastic
supply. It can also arise from trends in physical construction costs under certain conditions.
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of steady state house price growth in MSA i at time t:

P Gi,t = di,t + εi,t ,

t = 1, . . . , T.

(2.1)

Glaeser, et al. (2012) implies that di,t = d0 for all t if the market is on its steadystate growth path and is not being shocked in any way. Thus, the beginning of a local
housing boom can be identified by testing for the existence of one or more structural
breaks in the parameter di,t . To do this we follow well-established methods in the
time series literature for estimating structural breaks.
Borrowing heavily from Estrella’s (2003) notation, the null hypothesis is that dt
is constant for the entire sample period:

H0 :

di,t = d0 ,

t = 1, . . . , T.

The alternative is that di,t changes at some proportion, 0 < π < 1, of the sample
which marks the beginning of a housing boom. Specifically,

H1 :

di,t =




d1 (π), t = 1, . . . , πT


d2 (π), t = πT + 1, . . . , T.

For any given π, it is straightforward to carry out this hypothesis test. However,
things are slightly more complicated when π is unknown and the determination of its
value is the primary interest, as is true in our case.
To see how we estimate the value of π and assess its statistical significance, let
Π = [π1 , π2 ] be a closed interval in (0, 1) and let S be the set of all observations from
t = int(π1 T ) to t = int(π2 T ), where int(·) denotes rounding to the nearest integer.
The estimated break point is the value t∗ from the set S that maximized the likelihood
ratio statistic from a test of H1 against H0 .19
19

We use the terms supremum and maximum interchangeably in this exposition. Technically, all
of the results are in terms of the supremum of the likelihood ratio statistic.
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Assessing the statistical significance of this estimate requires knowing the distribution of the supremum of the likelihood ratio statistic as calculated from among the
values in S. Let ξ = supS LR denote this supremum. Andrews (1993) shows that the
distribution of ξ can be written as





k B1 (s) k
1/2
P (ξ > c) = P supπ∈Π Q1 (π) > c = P sup1<s<λ
>
c
s1/2

(2.2)

where k B1 (s) k is the Bessel process of order 1, λ = π2 (1 − π1 )/π1 (1 − π2 ), and

Q1 (π) =

(B1 (π) − πB1 (1))0 (B1 (π) − πB1 (1))
.
π(1 − π)

Calculation of the probability in Equation (2.2) is non-trivial. However, Estrella
(2003) provides a numerical procedure for doing so. Using that method, we are able
to calculate p-values for the estimated break points for each MSA in the sample.
Note that this procedure generates a breakpoint estimate regardless of whether the
structural break represents a positive or negative change in the price growth rate. In
the cases where the estimated break point is either insignificant or implies a negative
change in growth rates, we conclude that the market did not have a boom. That
is the case for the 15 interior markets shown in the first panel of Figure 2.1. For
those locations where we do find evidence of a statistically significant and positive
break point, we then proceed to test for the existence of two breaks against the null
of only one. To do so, we closely follow Bai (1999) and Bai and Perron (1998) and
we refer the reader to Appendix 2.7.1 for the details of this procedure. A few MSAs
were found to have experienced more than one structural break. However, for almost
all of those cases, the secondary breaks were small economically or not significantly
different from zero. Moreover, the estimation of a secondary break generally does
not displace the location of the main structural break. Therefore, we only use the
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estimation of one main structural break in this paper.

2.2.2

Contagion in Local Markets

A potential role for neighbors to influence house price growth in a focal market arises
naturally within the dynamic urban model of spatial equilibrium referenced above.
While users of that framework typically presume that shocks originate from own
market fundamentals, they could arise from neighboring markets as well. In our case,
we are interested in whether neighbors that just had housing booms may impact
housing outcomes in the focal metropolitan area, all else constant. Such contagion
effects could arise due to fundamental, informational, or psychological factors.
An example of a fundamental factor generating spatial spillovers is a positive
industry or income shock that triggers a housing boom in one local labor market.
For example, if there is such a shock in the Silicon Valley, house prices in the San
Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara MSA will increase in the short run given supply constraints, and perhaps start a housing boom. Neighboring areas, such as the San
Francisco-Oakland-Fremont MSA (or smaller, but more distant, metropolitan areas
in the central valley of California), may eventually benefit from that positive income
shock, as some of the Silicon Valley jobs could migrate to nearby areas. Even though
such fundamental spillovers may occur with lags, house prices in the neighboring
markets should immediately capitalize the expectation of future economic growth.
Housing market shocks could also be disseminated through the credit market
channel. In the example above, Silicon Valley lenders may achieve extra profits since
foreclosures and delinquencies tend to decline during an economic boom. If those
lenders decide to reinvest profits and expand market shares in a nearby MSA possibly
because it is less costly to expand business to nearby communities then the San
Francisco metro may observe a shift in the availability of credit, which will boost
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its housing market both in the short and in the long runs.20 A similar mechanism
could exist for land owners and housing investors in the Silicon Valley. Their wealth
increases after the beginning of the Silicon Valley housing boom, which could trigger
an expansion of investments into neighboring MSAs.21
Spillovers could arise even in the absence of large realized future fundamental
changes in San Francisco or the central valley. Residents in those neighboring markets
may be right to think that some type of positive income spillover will occur from the
Silicon Valley boom, but they may incorrectly predict its magnitude. Those biased
expectations can lead to short-run increases in their housing prices.22 Additionally,
irrational factors may lead residents in the focal market to have not only incorrect,
but also non-fundamentally based expectations about future price growth in their
market following a shock to a nearby area.
Finally, the housing boom in the Silicon Valley may generate another type of
psychological spillover effect. An increase in Silicon Valley housing prices may lead
their own local residents to pay more attention to what is happening in neighboring
markets, such as the city of San Francisco. Therefore, a shock that makes the focal
housing market and its interactions with neighbors more salient to investors may
itself lead to stronger contagion. Before discussing the econometric specifications to
identify contagion and its mechanisms, we next detail our main datasets.
20
Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) show how increases in the availability of credit to marginal
buyers can lead to overreaction in house prices.
21
Chinco and Mayer (2012) report that out-of-town speculators played a significant role in the
housing boom and that their presence may have exacerbated price increases in some markets. Bayer
et al. (2011), similarly document the rise of speculative activity during the housing boom.
22
A similar mechanism underlies the analysis in King and Wadhwani (1990) who document that
contagion in financial markets can arise as a result of attempts by rational agents to infer information
from price changes in other markets. Similarly, Clapp, et al. (1995) document characteristics of
house price dynamics that could be consistent with rational learning. Burnside et al. (2011) and
Favara and Song (2011) show how the presence of optimistic agents in the housing market can lead
to increases in house price levels and volatility.
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2.3

Data

Our house price data come from DataQuick, a private data vendor which collects the
universe of home transactions across the country. The sample used is for 99 metropolitan areas, with information on over 23 million individual observations ranging from
the first quarter of 1993 through the third quarter of 2009. We randomly split the
sample into two and in each subsample, we create a constant quality quarterly price
index for each MSA.23 One of these indices is then used to estimate timing of the
boom according to the structural break analysis described above, and the other is
used to analyze the magnitude of price changes following housing booms in neighboring markets. We adopt this strategy in order to avoid the specification search
bias identified by Leamer (1978).24 The mean, standard deviation, and interquartile
range for the price index we use to measure magnitudes are reported in the first row
of Table 2.1.
We also create a number of variables to measure fundamentals that are potentially
correlated with house price growth and the timing of the beginning of local housing
booms. We consider three types of fundamentals: (1) demand shifters, such as the
average income of mortgage applicants, MSA-level unemployment rates, and net migration flows; (2) buyer characteristics and property traits, including the percentage
of speculators, the percentage of minority buyers and the average square footage of
transacted housing units; and (3) credit market conditions, measured by the average loan-to-value ratio of home purchases, the percentage of mortgages originated by
23

We create a MSA-level constant quality house price series by quarter using hedonic regressions.
Price, in its logarithmic form, is modeled as a function of the square footage of the home entered
in quadratic form, the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, and the age of the home.
We also created a version of the Case and Shiller (1987) repeat sales price index for 14 Case-Shiller
markets that overlap with the DataQuick files, and found that the simple correlation of appreciation
rates on the two different indexes based on DataQuick is usually higher than 0.9. We employ hedonic
price indexes because their data requirements are much less onerous.
24
The bias from not doing this is large. For example, if we use the full DataQuick sample to
estimate both the timing of the beginning of the boom and the magnitude of the jump in price
growth at that time, the estimated jumps double those arising from a split-sample estimation.
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subprime lenders and those insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).
To construct many of the demographic measures of home buyers, we merge the
DataQuick files with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, which provide
information on the income and race of all mortgage applicants (not just those who
actually bought homes). In each time period, we calculate the average income of all
local loan applicants as reported in HMDA. Similarly, the “Percent Minority” variable
reflects the fraction of African-American and Hispanic loan applicants as coded in the
HMDA files.
MSA-level unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local
Area Unemployment Statistics series, and net migration flows are calculated using
data on county-to-county migration patterns provided on an annual basis by the
Internal Revenue Service.
“Percent Speculators” refers to the fraction of transactions involving a speculator
on either the buyer or the seller side of the transaction. Similar to Bayer, et al.
(2011), we define a person as a speculator if he or she is observed to have ‘flipped’ at
least two homes in the same metropolitan area during the entire course of the sample,
where a flip is defined as a purchase and sale of the same home within a two-year
window.
Credit market variables include the average loan-to-value ratio (LTV) among
homebuyers in DataQuick, the fraction of FHA-insured loans, and the fraction of
subprime loans. We use information on the underlying mortgage lenders from the
DataQuick files to calculate the share of subprime loans. More specifically, we obtained lists of the top twenty subprime lenders from 1990-onward in a publication
now called Inside Mortgage Finance.25 “Percent subprime lenders” is then defined as
the share of mortgages issued by these top twenty lenders.
25

This publication claims to capture up to 85% of all subprime originations in most years. Previously, it was named B&C Mortgage Finance. See Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) for
more details on these lenders and lists. Other papers such as Mian and Sufi (2009) and Keys, et al.
(2010) have access to micro-level FICO scores and use that to define subprime borrowers.
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As a control for changes in the composition of houses transacted, we also calculate
the average square footage of homes sold. This variable hardly changes during the
sample period. Note also that changes in the composition of transacted homes should
not materially affect our estimates given that we control for an extensive set of housing
characteristics when constructing the hedonic price series.

2.4

Econometric Model and Estimates

2.4.1

Econometric Model

As discussed in Section 2.2, the implications of the underlying dynamic model of urban
economics are readily extended to include shocks from neighboring housing markets.
We estimate the following reduced form model to gauge the impact of housing market
booms of close neighbors on the prices of the focal MSA m in Census Division d and
quarter t:

log(Pm,d,t ) =

4
X
r=−4,r6=0

+

4
X

θr1

·

1
ψm,r,t

+

4
X

θr2

·

2
ψm,r,t

r=−4,r6=0

+

4
X
r=−4,r6=0

θr · ψm,r,t
(2.3)

θτ · log(Pm,d,t−τ ) + γd,t + εm,d,t

τ =1

The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2.3) contains the primary vari1
ables of interest, the ψm,r,t
’s, which are indicators for the years relative to the begin-

ning of the housing boom of the closest neighboring market (neighbor number 1). The
coefficients, θr1 , on these indicator variables describe how prices in the focal market
evolve over the course of its nearest neighbor’s housing boom. We define Relative
Year [0] to be the 12-month period prior to the beginning of the neighboring market’s boom.26 Relative year [1] then includes the quarter in which the boom starts
26

We work with 12 month periods because there is noise in the quarterly data that is not due
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as well as the subsequent three quarters. Relative years from -2 to +3 are entered
individually, while all relative years greater (or less) than those numbers are binned
together.27 This allows us to see whether there are any important pre-trends and to
track the build-up of the boom after it starts. The second term on the right-hand side
2
of equation (2.3) includes an analogous set of controls, denoted ψm,r,t
, for the second

closest neighbor. In general, the effects for the second neighbor turn out to be both
economically and statistically insignificant in most specifications, so we report only
the coefficients on the nearest neighbor. In a set of robustness tests reported below,
we also control for log prices of other near MSAs, to make sure that our elasticity
estimates from the nearest neighbor are not confounded by other neighbors, or other
neighboring shocks.
Physical proximity is the most natural measure of distance, and the specifications
reported below assign the nearest neighbor based on the number of miles between the
centroids of the relevant metropolitan areas.28 As noted in the introduction, we also
experimented with a measure of proximity based on migration flows between pairs
of markets. Those results were qualitatively and quantitatively similar, so we do not
report them for space reasons.
This specification also controls for the time line of the focal market’s boom via
the third term on the right-hand side of equation (2.3). By including the relative year
effects of the focal MSA (denoted ψm,r,t , where the absence of a superscript indicates
solely to error in the estimation of the break point. For example, it is common for there to be at
least a one quarter difference between the time that a transactions price is agreed upon and when
the actual closing occurs. In addition, we know that prices in housing markets do not follow a
random walk, but move slowly and are strongly positively correlated over short horizons (Case and
Shiller (1987, 1989)). Locations for which we do not estimate a statistically significant boom are
still assigned a relative year according to their estimated break points.
27
We did estimate all our models with lengthier spans of individual relative years controlled for,
but they did not yield any new insights beyond those reported below.
28
Distances are calculated using the full set of MSAs according to the 2000 Census. Because we
only have price data for 99 of these MSAs, some data for nearest neighbors remain empty in 24 cases.
In our regressions, we create an indicator for whether we have price data for the nearest neighbor,
and interact this indicator with the relevant relative years. Fortunately, the results are qualitatively
similar when we drop MSAs with missing neighbors’ price data and also when we calculate distances
using only the 99 MSAs for which we have data.
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the variable refers to the focal market itself), we control for the average increase in
prices of the focal market over the course of its own boom. This vector serves a
similar role to the adjustments made in related financial economics research to deal
with upward bias in contagion estimates arising from volatility being higher in all
markets during ‘crisis’ periods (e.g., Forbes and Rigobon (2002)).29
The remaining terms of equation (2.3) include four quarterly lags of logarithm
of focal market prices to control for potentially unobserved time-varying characteristics of MSA m,30 as well as Census Division-by-quarter fixed effects to deal with
common regional shocks that might influence close neighbors simultaneously. Finally,
note that we do not control for contemporaneous focal market fundamentals in this
baseline specification. This is because they could represent intermediate outcomes
through which the contagion effect may be operating. In the mechanisms section
below, we will directly estimate the impact of the neighbor’s housing boom on those
intermediate outcomes, and also test whether their inclusion in equation (2.3) mitigates the contagion effect.

2.4.2

Main Estimates

Column 1 of Table 2.2 reports baseline estimates of equation (2.3) for the metropolitan areas whose nearest neighbors had statistically significant booms. The reported
coefficients show that prices were relatively stable in the three years prior to the beginning of the boom in the nearest neighboring MSA, so that there is no evidence
29

These controls do have their expected impact. If we do not control for the time line of the focal
market’s boom, the point estimates of the nearest neighbor’s contagion effects are about 20% higher
than those reported just below for our baseline specification in Table 2.2. However, the results are
not statistically different once the standard errors are taken into account. While this is consistent
with price volatility being artificially high when the focal market itself is booming, we do note
that including these indicators could also be controlling for intermediate outcomes. In any event,
including this vector is not biasing us towards finding contagion where none exists.
30
We also considered specifications that dispense with the lags of the dependent variable in favor
of a MSA fixed effect. Results from these specifications are qualitatively similar. However, we
believe that the lagged dependent variable specification is more appropriate given that omitted
time-varying common factors are more likely to confound the contagion effect than unobservable
but fixed MSA-specific characteristics.
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of a pre-trend. In the year that the neighboring MSA begins its boom (Relative
Year [1]), focal market prices then jump 0.87 percentage points and remain almost
1% higher for another couple of years. Column 2 reports the analogous coefficients
on the relative year dummies for the set of neighboring MSAs for which we do not
estimate a statistically significant or positive break point. These results confirm that
a positive effect is only detected when the neighboring MSA actually had a housing
boom. Hence, we find spillovers on focal market prices only if the nearest neighbor
actually experienced a significantly positive shock. While not reported here for space
reasons, the coefficients on the time line of the boom for the 2nd nearest neighbor
generally are not statistically different from zero regardless of whether this particular
neighbor had a housing boom. Hence, spillovers arise only from the closest neighbor.
In order to determine the elasticity of focal market housing price growth with
respect to near neighbors’ price growth, we need to gauge the magnitude of the
housing boom for the nearest neighbors. The starting point of this exercise is to
estimate a version of equation (2.3) that uses the log price of the nearest neighbor as
the dependent variable. Table 2.3 reports those results. Pre-boom prices are trending
down a bit in these results, and then jump 3% in the first year of the housing boom.
By the third year of the boom, prices are 8% higher than the pre-boom period, and
are more than 11% higher in subsequent years.31
An upper bound on the implied elasticity can be computed by using only the
estimates of price changes in the first year of the boom under the assumption that
agents in these markets are myopic. Combining these figures with the estimates from
Table 2.2 yields an elasticity of 0.27.32
While differences in data and methodologies make it difficult to directly compare
31

These magnitudes are similar to those in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) who conduct a similar
exercise using the full set of MSAs, not just those who serve as closest neighbors to some other
MSAs in the sample.
32
This is the result of dividing the 0.008688 spillover estimate from column 1 of Table 2.2 by
0.03224 from column 1 of Table 2.3.
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our estimates of contagion to others in the literature, our magnitudes appear to be
smaller and we find that spillovers only arise from the closest neighbors.33 We suspect
this is partially due to our empirical strategy that minimizes specification search bias
and includes various controls to deal with omitted factors related to common shocks.
Some of the differences also could be due to the current focus of our work–namely,
the dissemination of the boom rather than the spread of the bust.
A rough gauge of the relative importance of contagion in fomenting local booms
can be made as follows. Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) concluded that jumps in one
fundamental, local income growth, could account for one-half of the magnitude of the
jump in price growth at the beginning of local booms (on average). Our estimates
indicate that contagion did not play as important a role, but it still was economically
meaningful, as it can account for over one-quarter of the jump at the start of the
boom.34 Using different and more conservative figures and assumptions reduces the
share, but nothing reasonable can drive it below 10%.35
Finally, the economic interpretation of the contagion estimates for the years after
the beginning of the boom may be more complicated due to potential feedback effects.
Feedback effects are less of a concern in the first year of the boom, as we showed that
prices, roughly speaking, are in equilibrium right before that moment. It may not
33
For example, Cotter, et al. (2011) regress housing price appreciation in eleven MSAs near San
Francisco on the contemporaneous and 3 quarterly lags of San Francisco’s housing appreciation rate
and report coefficients ranging from 0.05-0.67 on lagged housing price appreciation of San Francisco.
Fuss, et al. (2011) model the volatility spillover intensity and suggest that a 1 percentage point
shock in housing return in Las Vegas could result in an eventual 0.19 percentage point increase in
housing return in San Diego.
34
To see this more clearly, start with the 0.27 elasticity just discussed. Given the 3.2% average
jump in Relative Year [1] reported in Table 2.3, that aforementioned elasticity implies that about
0.9 points, or about 27 percent of the jump at the start of the boom, can be explained by contagion.
35
It is not clear what figure to use for the average level of price growth in the denominator of this
ratio, which is why we focus more on the elasticity. The 3.2% number used here based on Table
3’s results is close to the log price changes reported in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011). However, one
also could use the 6.5% average jump in price growth rate (not the change in the log prices) also
reported by those authors. That number arises from an estimate that does not control for any year
or metropolitan area fixed effects. With that denominator, the 0.9 points amounts to about 14% of
the jump at the start of the boom. As noted in the text, there are no reasonable assumptions one
could make that drive the share below 10%.
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play a major role in subsequent years either, especially if only 10% of the main price
effect propagates across close neighbors. Nonetheless, contagion estimates for relative
years two and three, for example, are better thought of as reduced form estimates
that include the impact of recent contagion, but that also embed a share of contagion
from the complete path of price appreciation since the beginning of the boom.

2.4.3

Heterogeneity in the Contagion Effect

We test for heterogeneity in the average contagion effect along a number of dimensions. The first is distance. We already found that only the nearest neighbor matters.
A natural extension is to ask whether the strength of the contagion impact associated
with the closest neighbor increases with its proximity to its focal market. The first
two columns of Table 2.4 show that the answer is no. Those figures are the output
from a regression like that in equation (2.3) that further interacts the neighbor’s relative year dummies with an indicator for whether that neighbor is more or less than
the median distance of about 40 miles away from the focal market. Although the
estimates tend to be imprecise, the point estimates show little difference between relatively close and farther away nearest neighbors, especially around the time when the
neighbor’s boom begins. Thus, contagion effects arise only from the nearest neighbor,
but they do not vary materially based on how close that nearest neighbor is.36
It also seems natural to ask whether contagion impacts depend upon the relative
sizes of the focal and neighbor markets. To investigate this, we classified focal MSAs
whose population sizes are within ±50% of the population of the closest neighbor
as being of similar size. They are considered larger if they have at least 50% more
population, and smaller if they have less than 50% of the population of the closest
36

The interquartile range of distances between neighboring markets runs from 30-48 miles, so there
is not much variation for much of the sample. The mean is larger at 74 miles, but that reflects the
influence of Honolulu, whose nearest neighbor is over 2,000 miles away. The next biggest distance is
111 miles. We also experimented with alternative groupings such as dividing markets into whether
their nearest neighbor was less than 30 miles away, from 36-60 miles away, and greater than 60 miles
away. The results were no different from those reported here.
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neighbor. Appendix Figure 2.A shows the distribution of relative population size, and
the thresholds used to determine groups of MSAs for both geographic and economic
neighbors. The estimates reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 2.4
indicate that the contagion effect on a focal market is larger if the nearest neighbor
is substantially bigger than the focal area. Prices in the focal market are 1.3% higher
immediately when the large near neighbor booms, but are little changed when the
focal market is bigger (row 3 for Relative Year [1]). Prices stay higher in subsequent
years for focal markets being influenced by large neighbors. In sum, size does matter
and in an intuitive way in the sense that contagion effects are much larger (and
consistently statistically significant) if the nearest neighbor is large relative to the
focal market.
The final dimension along which we investigated whether there is any heterogeneity in contagion effects is by the degree of the focal market’s elasticity of housing
supply. For this test, we split the focal MSAs into three groups according to the
supply elasticities provided by Saiz (2010).37 Results are reported in the final two
columns of Table 2.4 for the bottom third (supply inelastic) and top third (supply
elastic) groups. Note that prices do not jump when the closest neighbor of an inelastically supplied market begins to boom. However, for the most elastically-supplied
metros, prices in the focal market are about 2% higher if its nearest neighbor begins
to boom. The gap increases to about 3% by the third year of the boom. Performing
calculations analogous to those discussed above for the economic importance of the
average contagion effect show that spillovers could account for nearly two-thirds of
the jump in prices at the beginning of booms in the most elastically supplied markets. Basic economics suggests that any contagion effects would be more likely to
be capitalized in the inelastically supplied markets, ceteris paribus, so this outcome
may seem counterintuitive at first glance. However, all else is not constant in this
37

Saiz (2010)’s supply elasticity estimates are available for only 76 of our metropolitan areas, so
we start with a smaller sample for this particular analysis.
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case. It turns out that a disproportionately large share of these markets are large
coastal metropolitan areas with relatively small neighbors.38 So, at least some of the
variation we document by degree of supply elasticity could have been driven by the
size effects just discussed.39
Clearly, no causal interpretation should be attached to this particular dimension
of heterogeneity. However, when combined with previous results from Ferreira and
Gyourko (2011), they help paint a more comprehensive picture of the beginning of
the last boom across markets with different supply sides. For example, those authors
report that a single own-market fundamental, the income of potential homebuyers
in that area, jumped at the same time as price growth escalated in those markets,
and did so by a magnitude large enough to account for virtually all of the increase
in price appreciation at the beginning of the booms in the nation’s most inelastically
supplied markets. If correct, that suggests there is little left to explain in terms of
the beginning of booms in these places, which is consistent with our finding of little
to no contagion effects there. In contrast, Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) also report
that income did not jump contemporaneously with price growth at the beginning of
booms in the most elastically-supplied markets, and therefore could not account for
their booms. The absence of an own market fundamental driver in these places does
38
Included in this most inelastic tercile are the metropolitan areas of Barnstable Town, MA,
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH, Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT, Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor,
OH, Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL, Eugene-Springfield, OR, Jacksonville, FL, Los
Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA, New Haven-Milford, CT, New York-Northern New JerseyLong Island, NY-NJ-PA, Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, Palm Bay-Melboune-Titusville, FL,
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA, Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce, FL, Riverside-San BernardinoOntario, CA, San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA, San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA, Santa
Rosa-Petaluma, CA, Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL, Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA, Tampa-St.
Petersburg-Clearwater, FL, and Vallejo-Fairfield, CA. Each of these areas also has one of the 99
markets in our sample as its closest market.
39
We also investigated whether contagion effects varied by the relative timing of booms in order
to see if contagion impacts occurred primarily when the focal market itself was booming. Appendix
Figure 2.B shows a histogram of the difference between the timing of the boom of the focal MSA
and its closest neighbor. There is wide variation in timing of the booms of these pairs of markets.
We find that contagion effect seems concentrated in focal MSAs that were already booming when
the closest neighbor started to boom. This result suggests salience being a feature of the contagion
effect. But as with the heterogeneity by supply elasticity, relative timing is correlated with other
factors, such as market size.
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not necessarily imply a role for contagion, but it shows there is room for it. And, we
find that it played a significant role.40

2.4.4

Mechanisms

In this subsection, we begin to investigate some of the potential mechanisms that
could account for the influence of a near neighbor’s boom on house prices in the
focal market. We are particularly interested in whether our contagion effects are
fundamentally-based in the sense discussed in Section 2.2. If not, the relevance of
our results for policy makers is increased, as they well may want to reevaluate their
past practice of not intervening in response to asset booms in housing markets if
their spread is based on some type of irrational exuberance or otherwise mistaken
expectations.
We begin by asking whether there are visible economic changes in the focal market
that may be driven by the neighboring market boom. We then alter our baseline
specification to account for these potential fundamental drivers. Four fundamentals
are investigated, with each having received prominent mention in previous academic
research or by policy makers and the popular press. They are focal market income,
mortgage market activity, net migration flows into the focal market and the share of
house ‘flips’ in overall market sales. Table 2.5 reports results using these local market
traits as the dependent variable in a specification similar to that in equation (2.3),
with one difference being that here we include MSA fixed effects rather than own
price lags.
Column 1 reports estimates for focal market income, where income is defined as
40

The markets in the most elastic tercile which also have one of our 99 markets as their closest
neighbor include mostly smaller metropolitan areas in the interior of the country and off the west
coast of California. These include Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN, Columbus, OH, Corvallis,
OR, Dayton, OH, Flagstaff, AZ, Fresno, CA, Gainesville, FL, Merced, CA, Modesto, CA, Pittsfield,
CA, Redding, CA, Stockton, CA, Visalia-Porterville, CA, and Yuba City-Marysville, CA. These
smaller markets tend to have bigger neighbors. And, note that this list does not include big Sunbelt
housing bubble markets such as Phoenix and Las Vegas (which are in the middle tercile and which
do not have significant contagion effects).
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the average income for all mortgage applicants in that market and quarter. If what
is driving our contagion result is a real spillover such as focal market income going
up because of boom in a nearby market, then we should see it changing along the
timeline of the neighbor’s boom. Table 2.5’s results show that there is a jump from
zero to 1% in Relative Year [1], but this impact is not precisely estimated (the tstatistic is 1.3). The results are similar for the second and third relative years. It is
only at least four years after the nearest neighbor booms that we see focal market
income higher by a statistically significant amount. One would not want to interpret
these coefficients as proving that contagion does not operate via spillovers onto focal
market income, but they also provide no robust evidence to the contrary.
The next two columns investigate whether the contagion effect might operate
through credit markets in some fashion. We approach this question by examining
two aspects of credit lender activities. First, we investigate whether the mortgage
lender bases become more similar during and after the nearest neighbor’s boom. The
intuition is that if lenders observe a boom in that neighbor, they might increase
their activity in the focal market for reasons just discussed in Section 2.2. We use
a proportional index to measure lender similarity.41 Second, we investigate whether
lenders speed up mortgage lending during and after the closest neighbor booms by
calculating the rate at which each lender increases mortgage issuance in the focal
market.
The regression results in Column 2 and 3 indicate that on average, both lender
similarity and lending amount largely are unaffected by the housing boom of the
nearest neighbor.42 Lending amount by subprime lenders also does not respond to
the neighbor’s boom. If we restrict the analysis to the top 5 lenders with the highest
PL
This lender similary index is calculated as 1 − 12 l=1 | ml − nl |, where m and n are the market
shares of lender l in the focal and the nearest neighbor markets, respectively. A value of zero implies
no similarity, while a value of one means that each lender has the same shares in both markets.
42
This is one case in which classifying neighbors based on economic rather than geographic distance
matters. Lender similarity increases by 1.3 percentage points by relative year three when we use
migration flows to order neighbors.
41
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lending amount for each market, we observe a jump in lender similarity index in
Relative Year [1]. However, this result is not robust when we go from top 5 to top 10
or top 3 lenders. Including only top lenders also leads to a jump in lending growth
rate in Relative Year [2] (the coefficient is around 0.5), but not in Relative Year
[1]. However, lending growth also is higher before neighbor’s boom, with coefficients
on Relative Year [-1] and Relative Year [-2] being in the range of 0.2-0.4. Given this
noticeable pre-trend, it is difficult to come to any conclusion that major credit lenders
are the channel in disseminating positive housing market shocks. Therefore, based
on our two measures of lender activities, we did not find robust and material role of
lenders in causing contagion.43
The fourth and fifth columns report analogous specifications using net migration
between two MSAs (which uses IRS data on annual tax records) and focal market
flippers (based on the fraction of transactions conducted by speculators) as the dependent variable. Both sets of results show no discernible effect before or after the
beginning of the nearest neighbor’s housing boom.44
The fact that only focal market income shows any correlation with the time line of
the nearest neighbor’s boom, especially its beginning, indicates that these fundamental factors are unlikely to be able to account for our estimated contagion elasticity.
Table 2.6 provides additional support for this conclusion with alternative specifications similar to our baseline equation (2.3) that use the logarithm of focal market
43

Nonetheless, this average result does not exclude the possibility of major credit lenders responding to neighbor’s booms in other dimensions. The increase in similarity index among top lenders
and the dip in their lending amount right at neighbor’s boom may suggest some bank-level spillovers
or substitution effects going on across markets. To fully understand the role of credit markets in
this contagion context would require a closer examination of a full spectrum of lender behaviors,
including those at the corporate level (e.g., mergers and acquisitions, and shocks to other business
sectors of lenders), which is beyond the scope of this paper.
44
We also investigated the shares of experienced and inexperienced speculators, respectively. Speculators are defined as experienced if having flipped at least four homes during the sample period, or
inexperienced if otherwise. We did not find significant jumps in either experienced or inexperienced
flippers when the closest neighbor begins its boom. However, the market share of experienced flippers declined by up to 0.5 percentage point (which is statistically significant) since two years after
the closest neighbor booms, which is in line with those types of flippers being more sophisticated in
timing the housing cycle and maximizing their return (Bayer et al., 2011).
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price as the dependent variable. The first column reports results from a model that
includes focal market fundamental controls and the log average price of near neighbors on the right-hand side, in addition to the standard controls from the baseline
specification in Table 2.2. Our fundamental controls are local incomes, migration,
subprime and FHA lending market shares, percentage of speculative buyers, percent
minority, average loan-to-value, average square footage, and the local unemployment
rate. Note that these new estimates are very similar to the baseline results presented
in Table 2.2. Controlling for these fundamentals does not change the magnitudes
or time pattern of estimated contagion effects very much, indicating that the spatial
spillovers are not being transmitted via the fundamentals that we consider here.
Thus far, we have abstracted from expectations of future fundamental factors,
effectively treating actors as myopic. The second column of each panel in Table 2.6
begins to address this issue by adding four leads of own market income to the previous specification.45 Effectively, this presumes that local residents can fully predict
the path of local incomes over the next four quarters. The inclusion of such stylized
expectations does not change the estimated contagion effect. The third and final
column of each panel reports results from adding four quarterly leads of all fundamentals, not just income. Once again, the magnitudes of the point estimates as well
as the time pattern are relatively unchanged.
That we find no evidence that these spatial spillovers work through fundamental factors has potentially important implications for how policy makers should view
intervention during housing booms. To the extent the booms are spread by nonfundamental forces (e.g., some type of Keynesian/Shillerian irrational exuberance),
they might want to try to stop them from growing in scale and scope. Of course,
fundamentals could encompass more than just income growth (or speculators, migration, etc.), and we would like to control for expectations as generally as possible. One
45
We report results for including leads of only this fundamental separately because it was the only
one that exhibited any positive correlation with the time line of the closest neighbor’s boom.

97

extreme way that does eliminate the impact of contagion is to presume that the future
path of price growth in the focal market is known with certainty in every period. In
this context, the effect of a nearby housing boom on future prices in the focal MSA
is immediately known and expectations are simply equal to the future value of price
growth in the focal area. Adding four quarterly price growth leads completely wipes
out the contagion impact. This indicates that the spillover could be operating primarily via expectations. Unless those expectations are based solely on fundamentals,
the implications just discussed still hold. The likelihood that contagion operates via
effects on expectations makes that issue an essential component of future research,
but that clearly is beyond the scope of the current paper.

2.5

Additional Analysis: Instrumental Variable,
Extensive Margin and Housing Bust

2.5.1

Alternative Model and Instrumental Variable

In this subsection, we relate price changes in the focal MSA with price changes from all
neighbors, not just the nearest two. This direct estimation of the contagion elasticity
has the benefit of allowing us to use an instrumental variable strategy to deal with
omitted factors. Also, by interacting the price changes of the closest neighbor with
a set of relative year dummies, we are able to explore how this effect varies over the
course of a neighbor market’s housing boom. The downside of this approach is that
the specification does not allow us to fully observe the dynamic pattern of contagion,
as we restrict the effect of neighboring price changes to operate through only one
quarterly lag.
More specifically, we group neighboring locations into bins based on their distance
from the focal market and estimate the following equation:
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where ∆P̄m,t−1
is the lagged average price growth among neighboring MSAs falling

into bin k for focal MSA m. In theory, we could allow each neighbor to be in its own
bin based on how close it was to the focal area. However, that turns out not to be
practical due to data limitations, so we bin neighbors based on distance rankings
1, 2, 3-5, 6-10 11-50, and 51+.46 This makes the coefficients, ρk , the elasticity of
focal area current price growth with respect to the average of lagged price growth
among neighbors in bin k. For the closest neighbor, we further interact the lagged
price growth variable with relative years to that neighbor’s boom – resulting in a
coefficient, ρ1r , for each of the closest neighbor’s relative years, as shown in the first
term on the right-hand side of (2.4). Relative year [0] again is the omitted category
in all specifications. Thus, the coefficients on the lagged average price growth of the
closest neighbor are interpreted relative to the effect in the 12-month period prior to
that neighbor’s boom.
One concern is that, even after including lags of the dependent variable (the
third term on the right-hand side of (2.4)) and area-by-time fixed effects (the γd,t
vector), there still could be some common omitted factors helping drive the observed
correlations. Ideally, we would like an instrumental variable that shifts the lagged
average price growth of the focal MSA’s closest neighbor, but does not directly affect
the contemporaneous appreciation rate in the focal market itself. If taken literally,
46
As in our main regressions, we include an indicator for whether we have price data for a given bin
and interact this indicator with the relevant lagged average price variable. Results are qualitatively
similar when we drop MSAs with missing neighbors’ price data and also when we calculate distances
using only the 99 MSAs for which we have data.
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our estimating equation implies that further lags of the neighbor’s price growth could
potentially serve as an instrument because those variables would only affect the focal
market’s contemporaneous price growth through their impact on the lagged neighbor’s
price growth. This leads us to instrument for the lagged average price growth in each
group of neighbors using one further lag of the average price growth among the
relevant neighboring areas.47
Table 2.7 reports the results of estimating equation (2.4). Once again, there is a
clear pattern that shows a shift in the importance of contagion right after the first
year that close neighbors boom. Estimate for the first year of the closest neighbor’s
boom is 0.148, or approximately half the elasticity derived from our baseline estimates
when considering the first year of the housing boom. Estimates for subsequent relative
years fade relatively slowly.

2.5.2

A Hazard Model of Housing Boom Contagion

Our work above focuses entirely on the magnitude of contagion. In this section,
we give empirical content to the extensive margin on the timing of booms that was
suggested by Figure 2.1. We estimate simple hazard models to see if the probability
of a focal market booming is influenced by the fact that neighbors boomed previously,
after controlling for a host of covariates that also might account for the beginning of
a boom.
Recent work on technology diffusion provides an intuitive way to generate contagion that is particularly appropriate for the specifications estimated in this subsection. In some of that research, contagion refers to a process in which people adopt a
new technology when they physically meet with others who have already adopted it
47

It turns out that the second quarterly lag of neighbor’s price growth has a small and statistically
insignificant impact on the focal MSA price appreciation, after controlling for all other covariates.
In the specifications that interact the lagged average price growth of the neighbors with the focal
MSA relative year indicators, we also interact lagged neighbors income growth and the second lag of
neighbor’s price growth with the focal area’s relative year and include the full set of these interactions
as instruments.
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(Young (2009); Comin et al. (2012)). In our context of housing booms, this suggests
that the probability of one metropolitan area entering a housing boom increases with
its connection to other areas that already have boomed. A standard assumption is
that the intensity of the connection decays in distance between MSA pairs at a constant rate. Given that assumption, it is straightforward to generate the following two
conclusions from a simple model: (a) if MSA q enters a housing boom at time t, that
increases the hazard of MSA m (m 6= q) having a housing boom at time t + 1; and
(b) this contagious effect is larger the closer is MSA m to MSA q.48
To investigate these implications, we begin by estimating whether the beginning
of booms in neighboring MSAs affects the hazard of the focal MSA entering a housing
boom. We consider the following proportional hazard model relating the hazard of
each focal MSA entering a boom in quarter t, hm (t), to a series of factors as noted in
the following equation:
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The primary coefficients of interest are the γk ’s on variable

P

j∈Nik

Boomj,t−1 , with

the latter reflecting the number of MSAs among neighbors in bin k that began their
boom in the previous quarter. We allow for multiple groups of neighbors (indexed by
k) based on how close they are to the focal MSA. As before, we rank each focal MSA’s
neighbors and group them into K mutually exclusive bins based on these ranks, with
k
Sm
denoting the set of neighbors in bin k for focal MSA m. A positive coefficient γk

would suggest a positive contagion effect. If the contagion effect decays with distance,
48

See Appendix 2.7.2 for a more formal presentation of how that approach generates specifications
of the type we estimate in this section.
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we should also expect the γk ’s of closer neighbors to be larger than those of farther
away neighbors. As with the estimation of magnitudes, we control for many potential
correlates of a housing boom through vector ∆Xm,t .
We use the same bins as in Table 2.7. Table 2.8 then lists summary statistics
on the number of booms started across the different bins of neighbors. The very
small means for the bins containing five or fewer markets document how unlikely it is
that even a single boom began in any given quarter among the few markets in those
P
bins. Thus, the lagged value of this variable ( j∈Sm
k Boomj,t−1 ) will contain many
zeroes, making it difficult to estimate precise contagion effects about the timing of
the beginning of local market booms. Nevertheless, we use these bins initially given
the differential importance of the two closest neighbors in the contagion magnitude
results and discuss findings later that use larger bin sizes.
Our baseline results are from a common parametric specification, the exponential
model, which assumes a flat baseline hazard h0 (t) = exp(α0 ). Implied changes in
the probability of the focal area experiencing a boom this quarter (i.e., the hazard
ratio) from one more neighbor having experienced a boom last quarter are reported
in Table 2.9. The unconditional hazard, which is reported in column 1, indicates
that the probability of the focal MSA booming this quarter more than triples if one
more of its two physically closest neighbors boomed last quarter. The coefficients on
the next three bins (Neighbors[3-5], Neighbors[6-10], and Neighbors[11-50]) are much
smaller and none is statistically significant at conventional levels. That the lack of
significance might be due to the nature of these variables having so little variation is
indicated by the statistically significant impact of the group of furthest away markets
(Neighbors[51+]). Still, it is lagged booms among the two closest neighbors that have
the strongest correlation with a contemporary boom in the focal market.
Controlling for a standard set of covariates lowers the estimated effect substantially, as reported in column 2. This time, the coefficients on the bins for all but the
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two closest neighbors are close to or below 1, indicating they have no positive impact
on the probability of the focal market booming this period. And, the coefficient on
the bin for the two closest neighbors falls by more than half. Even the 49% increase
in probability implied by the coefficients on Neighbors[1-2] is not statistically significant, although that could be due to the nature of our data as discussed above. This
conclusion is supported by the findings reported in column 3, which uses a Weibull
hazard.49 It reports a statistically significant correlation between lagged booms in
very near neighbors and contemporaneous booms in the focal markets. These results
show that if one of the two closest neighbors boomed last quarter, the probability of
the focal market booming this quarter is about 70%-80% higher. The standardized
marginal effect is smaller, of course, given the 0.18 standard deviation on Neighbors[12]. Using the middle of the range estimate from the Weibull hazard model, it is about
30% (i.e., 1.69*0.18).
These results only allow for a contagion effect from a single quarterly lag of neighbors’ booms. We also estimated models that allowed for an increase in the number
of booming neighbors over the past 6 to 12 months. There is a modest increase in
the hazard (to 32%) if we allow for booms in any of the previous two quarters, but
the result does not increase further if we allow for booms in any of the previous four
quarters. Thus, the spatial effect estimated here appears to happen fairly quickly.
This is also consistent with the elasticity estimates reported above.
The magnitude of the economic impact is hard to gauge on its own. We can
gain some useful perspectives by comparing it to the impacts on the hazard ratio of
standard deviation changes in other variables. Among the underlying controls, the
focal market’s current income growth and previous quarter’s price growth also were
highly statistically significant predictors of a higher probability of booming. A one
standard deviation higher own income growth rate is associated with about a 28%
49

A Weibull hazard model presumes a monotonic baseline hazard h0 (t) = ptp−1 exp(α0 ). We
experimented with different functional forms to see if the pattern of results was materially affected.
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higher probability of the focal market booming. A one standard deviation higher rate
of lagged house price appreciation is much more influential, as it is associated with
an 87% higher hazard ratio. Thus, the standardized marginal effect of a boom in
a very close neighbor appears to be quite influential and on a par with a standard
deviation increase in its own income growth rate.50 And, that we still find a meaningful influence of lagged near neighbors after controlling for everything else shows that
the implications of the ‘eyeball econometrics’ from Figure 2.1 are not entirely due to
many other potentially important factors.51

2.5.3

Was There Contagion During the Spread of the Housing Bust?

Our results indicate that contagion played a statistically and economically meaningful
role in the timing and magnitude of the spread of housing booms across metropolitan
areas. For completeness, we also explored the extent to which the same is true for
the bust. In many respects, analysis of the bust is more challenging. One of the
challenges is in deciding how bust is defined and determined. We choose it to be
the quarter in which nominal house prices peaked in the relevant MSA. While that
may be intuitive, it also is much more ad hoc than our definition of the beginning of
the boom, which is based on an external prediction of an economic model. Another
challenge is that the bust was much more temporally correlated across markets than
was the boom. This can be seen in Figure 2.3 which plots histograms of the quarters
50
The growth rate in the percentage of buyers with mortgages insured by the FHA also is a very
powerful control. As expected, it is associated with a lower probability of booming. Specifically, a
one standard deviation increase in that share is associated with an 86% fall in the hazard. Other
statistically significant controls include the growth rate of the metropolitan area unemployment rate,
as well as the second and fourth quarterly lags of focal market house price appreciation.
51
Conditional hazard model estimates using more aggregate bins (Neighbors[1-10], Neighbors[1150] and Neighbors[51+]) do not show any impact on the timing of the beginning of the boom in focal
markets. Averaging across the ten closest neighbors masks the distinct impact of the two closest
neighbors. As in the analysis of the magnitude of contagion, only the closest neighbors appear to
matter.
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in which local market booms and busts began. This plot includes all markets that
had a statistically significant boom. Note that the temporal concentration of busts
is much greater, with every market experiencing a peak in prices within a 2.5-3 year
period from mid-2005 through early 2008.
Figure 2.4 then provides more geographical detail with its plots of market busts
over time. The first panel in this figure is identical to the first panel in Figure 2.1
and plots the MSAs for which we never estimate a statistically significant boom. The
remaining panels show the timing of the bust among those MSAs that experienced
booms. Unlike Figure 2.1’s plots of the time line of metropolitan area booms, we
see markets in all parts of the country, not just in coastal California and upper New
England, with early price peaks between 2003-2005. The largest fraction of those
peaks happening in the last two quarters of 2005. Thus, the beginning of the bust is
more national in scope than was the beginning of the boom. The subsequent plots
in this figure do show a spreading out of the ‘busts’ to nearby markets. In the west,
prices tended to peak earlier in interior markets and then spread to the coast. In
Florida, the first price peaks were in markets on both coasts of that state. Peaking
then occurred in a few other coastal markets before spreading to interior markets.
While this has the flavor of contagion seen in the start of the boom, more detailed
analysis shows this not to be the case. For example, Table 2.10 reports hazard model
estimates akin to those in Table 2.9, except here the dependent variable is the start
of the bust, not the start of the boom. Unconditionally, lagged busts of neighbors are
positively correlated with contemporary busts in focal markets, and near neighbors
matter the most (column 1). However, column 2 of this table shows this conclusion of
‘eyeball econometrics’ from Figure 2.4 does not survive the inclusion of covariates.52
In Table 2.11 we estimated price specifications for the bust akin to those in Table
2.2. First, using geographic distance, we do not see significant jumps in the magnitude
52

All markets are used in this particular estimation, including those that did not boom. The
results are virtually identical if we restrict the sample to those that did boom.
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of the contagion effect in Relative Year [1]. But focal prices decline by 1.2% and 3.8%
in relative years two and three respectively. Results using economic distance follow
a similar pattern. When compared to the magnitude of the price decline in the
neighboring MSA, we find an elasticity of around 0.15. Those results are surprisingly
similar to the ones observed during the spread of the housing boom.

2.6

Conclusions

We provide estimates of the role of contagion in the most recent American housing
boom and bust. We find a statistically and economically meaningful role for contagion during the beginning and spread of the housing boom, and mixed evidence of
contagion for the bust. Our key results are as follows. First, contagion impacts arise
only from the very closest neighbors. There is no evidence of spillovers associated with
more distant neighbors. The elasticity of focal market prices with respect to changes
in its nearest neighbor’s prices is in the range of 0.10-0.27. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest this is large enough to account for up to 30% of the jump in prices
at the beginning of local booms, on average.
Second, they occur primarily in the most elastically-supplied markets and do not
appear to be relevant in inelastically-supplied areas. The economic importance of
spillovers is larger for the subset of the most elastically-supplied markets, accounting
for up to 60% of the beginning of their booms. Considered in tandem with findings
reported in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), these results help paint a more comprehensive picture of the beginning of the last boom in housing. One key fundamental, own
market income, can account for almost all of the initial jump in prices in the nation’s
most inelastically-supplied metropolitan areas. Contagion appears to have played
little to no role in these places. In contrast, no fundamental change appears to be
correlated with the start of booms in the most elastically-supplied housing markets,
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but contagion from neighbors looks to have played an important role. Contagion
impacts are also greater when being transmitted from a larger to a smaller market.
Finally, we found that local fundamentals and expectations of future fundamentals
have very limited ability to account for our estimated contagion effect. That contagion
transmission is not associated with local fundamentals suggests a potential role for
non-rational forces. That is an issue in urgent need of new research because, if
contagion does reflect some type of irrational exuberance, policy makers may want
to rethink their past policy of not intervening to stop the spread of asset booms in
housing.

2.7
2.7.1

Appendix
Estimating Multiple Break Points

In estimating the break points, we allow for the possibility that a given market might
experience more than one housing boom during the course of our sample period. Our
method is recursive in that we first test for the existence of one break point against
the null hypothesis of zero. Given the existence of at least one break point, we can
then test the hypothesis of m + 1 break points against the null of m using the results
from Bai (1999). Bai and Perron (1998) show that the test for one break is consistent
in the presence of multiple breaks, which is what allows for this sequential estimation
procedure.
More specifically, let 0 < φ1 < · · · < φm < 1 mark the proportions of the sample
generated by the m break points estimated under the null hypothesis. For technical
reasons, we require that φi − φi−1 > π0 for some small π0 where we define φ0 = 0,
φm+1 = 1. Further, let ηi =

π0
,
φi −φi−1

i = 1, . . . , m + 1. The likelihood ratio test

compares the maximum of the likelihood ratio obtained when allowing for m + 1
breaks to that from only allowing for m. The distribution of this likelihood ratio
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statistic is given by:

P (LR > c) = 1 −

m+1
Y


1 − P (supπ∈[ηi ,1−ηi ] Q1 (π) > c)

(2.6)

i=1

which we calculate by recursive application of the method provided in Estrella
(2003).
We apply this procedure to test for the existence of two break points against the
null of one as well as three against the null of only two among those MSAs for which
we find at least two statistically significant break points. There are some noteworthy
practical issues involved with carrying out this procedure. We have not until this point
said where the sample proportions π0 , π1 , π2 come from. In practice, we restrict the
full sample period for each MSA to lie between the first quarter in the data and the
peak of price growth. We then do not allow any break points to lie in either the first
or last two quarters of this sample for each MSA. This determines the fractions π1
and π2 which, because different MSAs have a different number of quarters, will vary
across areas.
When estimating multiple break points, we further require that any two break
points be at least four quarters apart. This determines the fraction π0 which, again,
will vary across areas due to differing sample sizes. Because of these restrictions,
we are not able calculate p-values for many MSAs in the case of multiple breaks.
The reason for this can be seen from the expression in (2.6). Because this expression
requires that ηi < 0.5, we must impose that

π0
φi −φi−1

> 0.5 for all i. This implies that we

will not be able to calculate p-values for the two-break case in MSAs (neighborhoods)
where the first break is less than π0 /0.5 from the beginning of the sample period.
Naturally, this restriction is more burdensome when trying to calculate p-values in
the three break case.
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2.7.2

A Hazard Model of Housing Boom Contagion

Consider an economy with N metro areas. The probability of MSA m entering
a housing boom increases if it “meets” other MSAs which already have entered a
housing boom. Assume α is the frequency of such a meeting and that the connection
between MSA pairs decays in distance at rate δ. Following Comin, et al. (2012),
we can write MSA m’s probability of not entering a housing boom at time t + h
conditional on not having a housing boom in time t as:
"P
P (0, m, t + h) = P (0, m, t)

−δrmq
q6=m P (0, q, t)e
P
−δrmq
q6=m e

#αh
(2.7)

where rmq denotes the distance between MSA m and MSA q. Taking h → 0, we
have
∂ ln P (0, m, t)
= α ln
∂t

!
X

P (0, q, t)e−δrmq

!
− α ln

q6=m

X

e−δrm q

(2.8)

q6=m

By assumption, P (0, q, t) = 0, ∀t ≤ τ if MSA q enters a housing boom at time
τ . As long as some MSA enters a boom, equation (2.8) implies that

∂ ln P (0,m,t)
∂t

< 0,

so that the hazard of entering a housing boom increases over time. To consider the
contagious effect of housing booms, suppose MSA q booms at time t. That increases
the hazard of MSA m having a boom because
∂ ln P (0, m, t)
αe−δrmq
=P
>0
−δrmq
∂t∂P (0, q, t)
q6=m P (0, q, t)e
In addition, the contagious effect of a housing boom in MSA q decreases over
geographical distance, because
∂ 2 ln P (0, m, t)
αδe−δrmq
=P
>0
−δrmq
∂t∂rmq
q6=m e
In sum, this framework provides two relevant implications:
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Implication 1: The fact that MSA q enters a housing boom at time t increases
the hazard of MSA m (m 6= q) having a housing boom at time t + 1.
Implication 2: Contagion effect in Implication 1 becomes larger when MSA q is
closer to MSA m.
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Figure 2.1: Timing of Housing Boom by MSA
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Figure 2.2: Las Vegas’ Constant Growth Rate before Booming

Source: Ferreira and Gyourko (2011, Figure 2)
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Figure 2.3: Histograms of the Beginning of Booms and Busts, MSAs

113

Figure 2.4: Timing of Housing Busts by MSA
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
(1)
Mean

(2)
Std. Dev.

Price Index
Average Income ($1000’s)
Percent Minority
Percent Speculators
Percent FHA Insured
Percent Subprime Lenders
Average LTV
Average Square Footage
Unemployment Rate
Net Migration

132
75
.18
.054
.096
.14
.73
1672
5.9
266

52
26
.13
.032
.097
.075
.1
161
3.3
6878

N

5043

25

th

(3)
Percentile
96
56
.075
.031
.014
.087
.69
1584
4
-668

75

th

(4)
Percentile
156
86
.25
.071
.14
.19
.79
1764
6.6
1408

Notes: Columns present descriptive statistics for all MSA-quarter observations in our sample. Observation counts in regressions will vary depending on the specification and control variables used.
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Table 2.2: The Impact of Nearest Neighbor Housing Boom on Focal Market Price
Dep. Var: log(Focal Market Price)
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]
Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [≥4]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
N

Neighbor Boom
Significant

Neighbor Boom
Insignificant

-.003029
(.004662)
-.000076
(.003184)
.008688**
(.004191)
.00977**
(.004236)
.008542*
(.004985)
.005247
(.004774)

-.003357
(.01543)
-.03365**
(.01526)
.00297
(.00563)
-.02102*
(.01091)
-.01698***
(.005502)
-.006412
(.004954)
Y
Y
Y
Y
4584

Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of
the closest geographic neighbor. Relative year [0] indicates the 12-month period preceding
the boom of the neighboring MSA and is the omitted category. All specifications also include
dummy variable(s) indicating whether the closest neighbor(s) are in the sample. Standard
errors are clustered at the quarter by Census Division level and are reported in parentheses.
Significance Levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively.

116

Table 2.3: The Impact of Nearest Neighbor Housing Boom on Nearest Neighbor Price
Dep. Var: log(Nearest Neighbor’s Price)
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]

(1)
.02815**
(.01333)
.01751
(.0153)
.03224
(.02066)
.06701***
(.02199)
.08197***
(.02188)
.1179***
(.01976)

Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [≥4]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
3583

Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable
for indicated relative years of the closest geographic neighbor.
Relative year [0] indicates the 12-month period preceding the
boom of the neighboring MSA and is the omitted category.
All specifications also include dummy variable(s) indicating
whether the closest neighbor(s) are in the sample. Standard
errors are clustered at the quarter by Census Division level
and are reported in parentheses. Significance Levels 10%, 5%,
and 1% are denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively.
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Table 2.4: Heterogeneity in the Impact of Nearest Neighbor Housing Boom on Focal Market Price
Distance
(2)

Relative Size
(3)
(4)

Focal Market Elasticity
(5)
(6)

Dep. Var: log(Focal Market Price)

(1)

Nearest Neighbor Relative Years

≤40 miles

>40 Miles

Focal Larger

Nbr. Larger

Inelastic

Elastic

-.004239
(.004747)
-.001823
(.003802)
.008405
(.005087)
.008409
(.005425)
.008389
(.007093)
-5.5e-06
(.005004)

-.001194
(.005436)
.001363
(.004727)
.008564
(.006187)
.009215
(.006344)
.005968
(.005006)
.0118**
(.005328)

-.001048
(.004448)
-.001269
(.003668)
.00461
(.00417)
.01116***
(.004208)
.007858
(.005809)
.005298
(.004551)

-.005334
(.005874)
.000373
(.003878)
.01288**
(.005703)
.009466*
(.005423)
.0104**
(.004913)
.008329
(.005509)

-.001111
(.006739)
-.003162
(.004464)
.00769
(.007545)
.008632
(.005739)
.00978
(.007775)
.01061*
(.006347)

.001165
(.007681)
.003788
(.006904)
.01877*
(.0103)
.02683**
(.01069)
.02897***
(.0102)
.01055
(.01232)

Relative Year [-2]
Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
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Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [≥4]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Own Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

4647

4584

3586

Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of the closest geographic neighbor interacted with
dummies for whether the focal market is in the category indicated in the column header for various measures of heterogeneity. Relative year 0
indicates the 12 month period preceding the boom of the neighboring MSA and is the omitted category. All specifications also include dummy
variable(s) indicating whether the closest neighbor(s) are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter by Census Division level
and are reported in parentheses. Significance Levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively.

Table 2.5: The Impact of Nearest Neighbor Housing Boom on Focal Market Fundamentals

Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]
Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
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Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [≥4]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Year-by-Census Division FE
MSA FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Focal Market Price and LTV growth
N

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Focal Market
Income

Lender
Similarity

Lending
Amount

Net
Migration

Focal Market
Flippers

-0.013
(.009)
-0.006
(.008)
0.011
(.008)
0.016
(.0115)
0.0135
(.0132)
.0229*
(.013)

.0127*
(.0065)
0.005
(.0051)
0.0025
(.0039)
-0.0015
(.0047)
0.0004
(.0071)
0.0048
(.0073)

0.0205
(0.0609)
0.0572
(0.0562)
0.0239
(0.0505)
0.0491
(0.0416)
-0.0230
(0.0448)
0.0194
(0.0618)

84.43
(132.6)
91.49
(132.9)
-43.23
(85.75)
-93.54
(78.01)
-165.4
(114)
-251.6**
(101.4)

.0078***
(0.0029)
0.0039
(0.0026)
-0.0004
(0.0032)
-0.0012
(0.003)
-0.0038
(0.0031)
-0.0037
(0.0032)

Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N

Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N

N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N

Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N

4877

4219

996941

1215

4829

Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of the closest geographic neighbor.
Relative year [0] indicates the 12-month period preceding the boom of the neighboring MSA and is the omitted category.
All specifications also include dummy variables indicating whether the closest neighbor is in the sample. Standard errors are
clustered at the MSA level and are reported in parentheses. Significance Levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ ,
respectively.

Table 2.6: The Impact of Nearest Neighbor Housing Boom on Focal Market Price,
Controlling for Local Fundamentals and Expectations
Dep. Var: log(Focal Market Price)
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]
Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [≥4]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Own Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Focal Market Fundamental Controls
Log Average Price of Neighbor Groups
Four Leads of Own Income
Four Leads of All Fundamental Controls
N

(1)

(2)

(3)

-.003202
(.004133)
-.000332
(.003053)
.007821**
(.003796)
.008964**
(.004278)
.00804
(.005421)
.003512
(.004924)

-.003899
(.003979)
-.000577
(.003016)
.008673**
(.003624)
.01033**
(.004157)
.008275
(.006464)
.006228
(.004178)

-.002159
(.004018)
.000934
(.00288)
.007878**
(.003235)
.008651**
(.003704)
.005047
(.005994)
.005626
(.004507)

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

4538

4142

4142

Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of
the closest geographic neighbor. Relative year [0] indicates the 12-month period preceding
the boom of the neighboring MSA and is the omitted category. All specifications also
include dummy variable(s) indicating whether the closest neighbor(s) are in the sample.
Standard errors are clustered at the quarter by Census Division level and are reported
in parentheses. Significance Levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ ,
respectively.
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Table 2.7: The Impact of Nearest Neighbor Price Changes on Focal Market Price
Changes, IV Results
Dep. Var: Focal Market Price Changes
Nearest Neighbor Price Changes
Relative Year [-2]

-0.045
(0.228)
0.041
(0.131)
0.148***
(0.037)
0.125***
(0.035)
0.090**
(0.037)
0.088***
(0.028)

Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [≥4]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Instrumental Variable
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
4131
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Table 2.8: Summary Statistics on Lagged Number of Booms for the Hazard Estimation
Lagged Number of New Booms

Neighbors
Neighbors
Neighbors
Neighbors
Neighbors
Neighbors

[1-2]
[3-5]
[6-10]
[1-10]
[11-50]
[51+]

Mean

Sd

Min

Max

% Zero Boom

0.0297
0.0393
0.0626
0.1317
0.3051
1.3055

0.1777
0.2058
0.2692
0.4246
0.6079
1.6134

0
0
0
0
0
0

2
3
3
5
7
6

97.20%
96.20%
94.30%
89.00%
76.20%
39.50%

Note: Neighbors are ranked with respect to their geographic distance from the focal MSA.
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Table 2.9: Hazard Model Estimates of Neighbor Booms on the Probability of Focal Market Booming
Unconditional
Hazard
Lagged Number of New Booms
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Neighbors[1-2]
Neighbors[3-5]
Neighbors[6-10]
Neighbors[11-50]
Neighbors[51+]
Lagged % MSAs that Already Boomed
Focal Market Fundamental Controls
Four Lags of Focal Market Price Growth
Census Region FE
N
Log-Likelihood

Baseline Results
Weibull
(Proportional Hazard) Hazard

(1)

(2)

(3)

3.49***
1.31
1.41
1.14
1.23***

1.49
0.79
1.26
0.86
1.02

1.69*
0.84
1.25
0.8
1.05

N
N
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

2114
-29.93

2114
29.43

2114
34.14

Note: Implied Hazard Ratios are reported along with indicators of statistical significance of the underlying
regression coefficients. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively.

Table 2.10: Hazard Model Estimates of Neighbors on the Probability of Busting

Lagged Number of New Busts
Neighbors[1-2]
Neighbors[3-5]
Neighbors[6-10]
Neighbors[11-50]
Neighbors[51+]
Lagged % MSA that Already Busted
Focal Market Fundamental Controls
Four Lags of Focal Market Price Growth
Census Region FE
N
Log-Likelihood

Unconditional
Hazard

Proportional Hazard
with Controls

(1)

(2)

1.66*
1.14
1.55**
1.12*
1.18***

0.96
0.74
1.08
0.96
1

N
N
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

3,637
2.181

3,637
100.1

Note: We define the time of housing bust as the quarter when price peaks in our sample period.
Implied hazard ratios are reported along with indicators of statistical significance of the underlying regression coefficients. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ ,
respectively.
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Table 2.11: The Impact of Nearest Neighbor Housing Bust on Focal Market Price
Dep. Var: log(Focal Market Price)
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]

(1)
-.01169**
(.004509)
-.003846
(.003101)
-.006359
(.005119)
-.01228**
(.006151)
-.03804***
(.007463)

Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
Relative Year [3]
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
5178

Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of the closest geographic or economic neighbor.
Relative year 0 indicates the 12 month period preceding the bust of the
neighboring MSA and is the omitted category. All specifications also
include dummy variable(s) indicating whether the closest neighbor(s)
are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level and
are reported in parentheses. Significance Levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are
denoted by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , respectively.
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Appendix Figure 2.A: Histogram of Percentage Difference in Population of Focal
Markets and Nearest Neighbors

Appendix Figure 2.B: Histogram of Number of Quarters between Timing of the Booms
of Focal Markets and Nearest Neighbors
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